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ABSTRACT
In the 1960s and 1970s academicians, economists and politicians favored state 
ownership over private ownership in the production and provision of goods and 
services. By the end of the 1980s, however, there was a reversal of public policy from 
state domination of the production and provision of goods and services to private 
ownership and operation. This was due in part to what the World Bank referred to as 
“state failure”, which was characterized by inefficient service delivery, unprofitable 
SOEs, high government debt, and stagnant economic growth rates. Accordingly, 
privatization caught on in many countries as a policy tool to foster efficiency, 
encourage investment, free public resources for investment in infrastructure and social 
programs to enhance economic growth and distributional equity.
In recent years, however, privatization has come under attack. The main 
criticism being that privatization results in the abuse of market power and social 
welfare losses. The perception of most people in the developing countries is that 
privatization usually benefits the rich at the expense of the poor in society. This study 
therefore is an attempt to empirically examine the claims and counter claims of the 
impact of privatization on economic growth and income distribution in developing 
countries. The study sample is made up of 80 developing countries that privatized their 
state-owned enterprises between 1991 and 2002. The findings of the study indicate that 
privatization did not have a significant impact on economic growth, but had differential 
effects on the distribution of income. The results of the study, however, suggest that 
country-specific characteristics, including good governance may be more important in 
promoting growth and reducing income inequality than any economic policy per se.
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In the past several years, governments all over the world have privatized state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in all sectors of their economies, including energy, infrastructure and 
financial services. Until the 1980s international policy tended to favor state planning in 
national development strategies. Public sector expansion was seen as a major instrument 
in economic development, employment, social welfare and national security (Vernon and 
Aharoni, 1981). In the developing countries especially, Cook and Kirpatrick (1988) note 
that public investment can perform the role of ensuring that the conditions necessary for 
industrial growth are met. The authors further argue that the need to accelerate the 
process of industrialization led to public sector participation in sectors believed to have 
significant linkages in the overall economy.
By the end of the 1980s, however, there was a reversal of public policy from state 
domination of the production and provision of goods and services to private ownership 
and operation. This was due in part to what the World Bank (1995) referred to as “state 
failure” which was characterized by inefficient service delivery, unprofitable SOEs, high 
government debt, and stagnant economic growth rates. A 1988 World Bank survey of 25 
developing countries shows that the median contribution of their SOEs to the overall 
public sector deficit was 48%, and between 1976 and 1983 the total debt of SOEs in 
developing countries was estimated to be $80 billion (Cowan, 1990).
Further, Musa (1996) asserts that state run economies’ inability to absorb external 
price shocks led to macroeconomic instability as evidenced by the debt crisis of the
1
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1980s. Consequently, privatization caught on in many countries as a policy tool to foster 
efficiency, encourage investment, free public resources for investment in infrastructure 
and social programs with the hope that they could lead to overall economic growth and 
reduction of poverty (Nellis, 1995). Privatization was therefore pursued worldwide as a 
response to the demands to the disappointing performance of government provision of 
certain goods and services (Clifford, 1993). Indeed, privatization has become what Miller 
(1997) describes as the new economic mantra, which will continue to exert influence on 
the lives of people in countries throughout the world well into the 21st century. Likewise, 
Feigenbaum and Henig (1997) claim that if any economic policy could lay claim to 
popularity, at least among the world’s political elites, it would certainly be privatization.
The trend toward privatization, however, has not been without debate. The debate 
over private versus public sector’s superiority in terms of efficiency has been going on 
for the past four decades. The debate initially focused on how the size of the public sector 
(measured by the size of government consumption) affected economic growth (Barro, 
1991; Landau, 1986; Ram, 1986; Rubinson, 1977). While Rubinson (1977) and Ram 
(1986) claim that government consumption has a positive effect on economic growth, 
Landau (1986) and Barro (1991) make claims to the contrary. Rubinson (1977) argues 
that a large government size proxied by government revenue as a percentage of GNP 
positively affects economic growth by reducing dependence, especially in poor or less 
developed countries. Landau (1986), on the other hand asserts that a large government 
size (proxied by share of government consumption in GDP) depresses GDP per capita 
income.
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By the end of the 1980s many studies pointed to the fact that private firms were 
more efficient than SOEs. For example, Shirley and Walsh (2001) in a review of 52 
empirical studies on the debate between the superiority of the SOEs and private firms 
report that 32 of the studies favored private firms, 15 results were ambiguous and 
superiority of SOEs were found in only five of the studies. In another review of the 
literature, Villalonga (2000) reports that of the 104 studies on the private versus public 
ownership issue; 55 were in favor of private ownership, 14 against, and 35 were neutral. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) in their extensive review of 65 empirical studies at the firm 
level, and in firms within and across countries, concluded that privately owned firms 
were more efficient and profitable than otherwise comparable SOEs. The World Bank’s 
(1995) Bureaucrats in Business, also indicates that government controlled firms perform 
less well than the private sector in a host of activities. It appears that while the theoretical 
and empirical studies were not able to completely settle the debate, the discussions seem 
to have favored private ownership due to the impact of increasing government debt, 
macroeconomic instability, and the declining world economy in the 1980s.
The privatization process has been ongoing for some time, and therefore it is 
appropriate to empirically examine the direct impact of privatization on economic 
performance. It is important to note that a few studies have examined the economic 
impacts of privatization, but none of the studies controlled for regional differences 
(Barnett, 2000; Cook and Uchida, 2003; Filipovic, 2005; Plane, 1997; Yoder et al., 1991). 
These five studies have examined the impact of privatization on economic growth but 
have reported contrasting results. While Barnett (2000) and Plane (1997) report a 
significant positive effect, Cook and Uchida (2003) show a significant negative effect and
3
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Filipovic (2005) and Yoder et al. (1991) indicate a negative but insignificant effect of 
privatization on economic growth. The inconsistent results might be due to omitted 
variable bias in terms of the regional differences. Obviously, regional differences are not 
associated with only geographic variables but also with social, political, and cultural 
norms that determine how privatization is implemented and hence its effect on economic 
growth.
This research attempts to fill this gap with respect to the privatization process as it 
has impacted various regions of the developing world. Contributions to the literature on 
privatization are twofold. First, as argued above, by controlling for regional blocs, the 
study contributes to the understanding of how privatization has impacted the economies 
of the different regions of the developing world. But even more important, it helps to 
reduce any bias in the estimation of the regression coefficients. Second, the study 
examines the impact of privatization on both economic growth and income distribution, 
as a government’s responsibility is not only to deliver services more efficiently, but also 
more equitably. Of the five studies mentioned above, only Yoder et al. (1991) examined 
the impact of privatization on economic growth and other measures of economic 
development, including income distribution, life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, and 
infant mortality rate.
However, Yoder et al. (1991) employed a correlational analysis to study the 
relationship between privatization and the development indicators and therefore could not 
control for other factors (macroeconomic stability and institutional infrastructure) that 
might affect economic growth and income distribution. Yoder et al. (1991) did recognize 
the weakness in their methodology and recommended further studies of the impact of
4
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privatization on the other measures of development. Until now most studies have 
responded to the first recommendation to employ more rigorous statistical methods 
(Cook and Uchida, 2003; Plane, 1997), but not much on the second recommendation in 
terms of analyzing the impact of privatization on the distribution of income. This 
dissertation therefore is a response to Yoder et al.’s (1991) call and the perception of 
many in the developing countries that privatization has benefited the rich at the expense 
of the poor (Kessides, 2004; Kikeri and Sunita, 1992; Nellis, 2003). Consequently, this 
study examines the impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality in 
developing countries between 1991 and 2002.
The time period (1991 -  2002) is selected because this is the period in which most 
countries in the developing world engaged in ambitious privatization programs (World 
Bank Privatization Database, 2005).
Purpose Statement
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of privatization on economic 
performance in developing countries between 1991 and 2002. The goal is to examine the 
impact of privatization on two economic development indicators: economic growth and 
income inequality. The study therefore seeks to examine whether the privatization 
programs implemented by most developing countries between 1991 and 2002 had a 
positive effect on both output growth and distributional equity as suggested by the 
advocates of privatization.
The dependent variables employed in this study are the economic growth rates 
and income inequality. The economic growth rates is represented by the Gross Domestic
5
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Product (GDP) per capita growth rates and income inequality is represented by the ratio 
of the share of going to the richest in the population and the share of income going to the 
poorest in the population. The main independent variable of interest is the privatization 
variable which is represented by the privatization revenues as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The study will also control for other variables that are known 
to affect growth (e.g., the degree of openness, fiscal and monetary policy, governance 
infrastructure, and the initial level of development).
Research Questions
Considerable time has elapsed since privatization was first implemented in a number of 
countries and therefore it is appropriate for the results to be evaluated at the 
macroeconomic level. This is particularly important in the developing world where 
privatization has been implemented as a political, economic, and social instrument for 
societal transformation (Stiglitz, 1998). Although a great deal of attention has been given 
to privatization in the developing world, most of the country-level studies have been 
descriptive and focused on the extent of privatization (Bennell, 1997; Berthelemy, 
Kaufmann, and Valfort, 2004), with only a few analyzing the empirically the impact of 
privatization. Consequently, more empirical research is needed to ascertain the impact of 
privatization in the various regions of the developing world. The dissertation will 
contribute to the empirical research literature on privatization by examining two main 
questions:
1. What is the impact of privatization on economic growth in developing countries?
2. What is the impact of privatization on income inequality in developing countries?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Significance of the Study
Privatization as an economic reform policy has been in effect now for a number of years 
and therefore it is appropriate to empirically examine the direct impact of privatization on 
economic performance. It is important to note that only a few studies have examined the 
economic impacts of privatization, but none of the studies controlled for regional 
differences. Accordingly, this dissertation will examine the effects of privatization as it 
has unfolded in various regions of the developing world. This is important because the 
extent and quality of privatization is different for the regions of the world, and 
subsequently, privatization’s effect might not be the same in all the regions. Further, 
government ownership is more prevalent in some region than others, and consequently, 
the impact of government intervention in the economy and corporate governance in 
general may be different for the different regions (Chong and Lopez, 2003; Kikeri and 
Kolo, 2005)
Finally, the different regions have different cultural, economic, and political 
institutions, which may affect the way privatization is implemented, and subsequently its 
effect on economic performance. An example is case studies of privatization in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. While Galiani et al. (2005) and McKenzie and 
Mookherjee (2002) claim that privatization resulted in improved performance in Latin 
America, Bayliss (2002a) reports otherwise in Sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Obaidan (2002) 
argues that the inclusion of countries in the regression analysis that are intrinsically 
different may result in unacceptable statistical bias. Clearly, developing countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia exhibit different socioeconomic 
characteristics. Accordingly, the inclusion of developing countries with different social
7
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and cultural characteristics requires the regional blocs to be controlled to reduce the 
problem of omitted variable bias associated with geographical differences and other 
region -specific factors.
The study contributes to the literature on privatization in two main ways. First, by 
controlling for regional blocs, it helps to produce consistent estimates of the effect of 
privatization and contributes to the understanding of how privatization has impacted the 
economies of the different regions of the world. Second, the dissertation examines the 
impact of privatization on both economic growth and income distribution, as a 
government’s responsibility is not only to deliver services more efficiently, but also to 
provide them more equitably. The focus on income distribution is important because the 
well-being of the poor has a special role in the objective function of policymakers. 
Further, economic reforms that do not reduce income inequality tend to generate 
discontent and ultimately are unsustainable (Eduardo and Ugo, 2002).
There is also a consensus in the economic development literature that high 
inequality slows growth and promotes political instability (Baliamoume-Lutz, 2004; 
Cling et al., 2006). Cling et al. (2006) also note that low income inequality strengthens 
the impact of growth on poverty reduction. The study focuses on the time period between 
1991 and 2002, as privatization picked up at the end of the 1980s and peaked at the end 
of the 1990s for most countries (World Bank Privatization Database). Focusing on this 
time period will help to identify how the extensive implementation of the privatization 
policy impacted the economies of the countries concerned.
8
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Overview of Study
The dissertation contains five chapters. Chapter one introduces the research and provides 
a general overview of the research problem. Chapter two provides a background of the 
intensity and pace of privatization in developing countries between 1991 and 2002 as this 
is the period in which most developing countries privatized their state-owned enterprises. 
Chapter three presents a review of the literature on privatization in which the theoretical 
arguments for and against privatization are offered and followed by an analysis of the 
empirical literature on privatization and its limitations. Chapter four discusses the 
methodology and data used in the research. This section also discusses the model 
specifications that are used to address the research questions. Chapter five presents and 
discusses the study’s findings, provides policy implications, limitations and suggestions 
for future research, and concluding remarks.




This chapter provides a brief discussion on the definition of privatization and recent 
privatization trends, and examines the extent to which government ownership is still 
prevalent in developing countries.
Definition of Privatization
Privatization is defined in many ways in the literature. It is a broad term but most simply 
defined as the transfer of assets or service delivery from the government to the private 
sector. Pirie (1986) identified over 22 definitions of privatization. In recent times, the 
term has been used to represent three main concepts: divestiture; deregulation; and 
delegation (Ghosh, 2004; Rothenberg, 1987; Savas, 2000). Divestiture refers to the 
partial or full sale of an enterprise from the public to the private sector. Deregulation, also 
known as liberalization, refers to the removal of restrictions on market entry and is 
intended to increase the role of competition. Change of ownership may not be involved. 
Delegation usually involves the government maintaining control and being responsible 
for the service delivery, but the actual production activity is done by the private sector. 
This means that the government usually provides the funding for the private sector to 
produce the service or good. Delegation is carried out by contract, franchise, and subsidy 
(grant or voucher).
The focus of the dissertation, however, is on the impact of the proceeds generated 
from the sale of government owned assets on economic growth and income inequality 
and, therefore the extent and trend of the of the divestiture is discussed next. It is
10
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important to note that the sale of government owned assets is the most popular method of 
privatization in developing countries. Unless otherwise stated, all the privatization 
transactions and proceeds utilized are from the World Bank Privatization Database 
(2005). The World Bank Privatization database shows that between 1988 and 2003, 
developing countries carried out about 9000 privatization transactions and raised nearly 
$410 billion in privatization revenues (See Table 1) or 0.5% of total developing country 
GDP during that period (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005).
Table 1: Privatization Numbers and Proceeds by Region, 1990-2003
REGION TRANSACTIONS PROCEEDS (US $ BNST
Middle East, North Africa 302 $18.9
South Asia 399 $15.4
East Asia/Pacific 417 $65.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 981 $11.5
Latin America, Caribbean 1,265 $195.1
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As presented in Figure 1 below, privatization activity peaked in 1997, reaching nearly 
$70 billion due to increased activity in large infrastructure and energy (oil and gas) 
transactions. The number of privatization transactions in 1997 was the least between 
1993 and 1998 (Figure 2), but the privatization revenues was the highest, which indicates 
that the privatization process involved the sale of highly valued SOE assets
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Although privatization activity increased in all regions of the world, the greatest 
increase was found in five countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (all from Latin America), 
China and Russia. These five countries generated privatization revenues of nearly $41 
billion out of a total of $67 billion generated by developing countries in 1997. 
Privatization activity, however, declined after 1997 to $50 billion in 1998, $40 billion in 
1999 and 2000 and reduced drastically to a low of $14 billion in 2001. Gradual increases 
in privatization were found after 2001 as the proceeds increased nearly 13% in 2002 and 
38% in 2003 (Figure 1). This was due to the fact that the average size of transactions 
increased over the years as countries began privatizing larger firms.
Figure 2: Privatization Transactions
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Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005).
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Regional Distribution
Even though the number of transactions and the proceeds generated from privatization 
increased in all regions of the developing world, proceeds were highly concentrated in 
Latin America and East Asia (Figure 3). Latin America accounted for 64% of total 
privatization proceeds with 39% of the total number of transactions, followed by East 
Asia with 13% of the transactions and 21% of the privatization proceeds, and the rest of 
the developing world accounting for 15% of the proceeds and 48% of the transactions.
Figure 3: Privatization Proceeds, 1988-2003
■ East Asia & Pacific
■ Latin Am erica & 
Caribbean




Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005).
Latin America
Latin America is the biggest privatizer in terms of both the quantity (number of 
transactions) and the proceeds generated from privatization (volume of assets sold)
14
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between 1988 and 2003. Latin America accounted for 39% of the total number of 
transactions (Figure 4) and nearly $195 billion or 64% of the total privatization proceeds 
(Figure 3) in developing countries between 1988 and 2003. Three countries; Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico accounted for over 75% of the regional revenues in the 1990s 
primarily from telecommunications, electricity, and energy in the 1990s.
Figure 4: Share of Privatization Transactions, 1988-2003
■ East Asia & Pacific
■ Latin America &
Caribbean
□ Middle East & North 
Africa
□ South Asia
■ Sub-Saharan Africa 
9%
Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005).
Latin America’s share of privatization transactions and proceeds began to fall gradually 
in the later part of the 1990s and fell dramatically in 2000 and afterwards (Figures 5 and 
6). The decline was due to the reduction in the stock of enterprises for sale and 
dwindling political desire to privatize additional sectors of the economy. Brazil, however, 
continues to be among the top ten privatizers in the developing countries after 2000 and 
contributes about 85% of the Latin America’s privatization proceeds (Kikeri and Kolo, 
2005).
15
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Figure 5: Privatization Proceeds, 1988-2003
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Figure 6: Number of Privatization Transactions by Region, 1988-2003
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East Asia and the Pacific
The World Bank Privatization Database (2005) indicates that after a slow start in the 
1980s, privatization in East Asia and the Pacific picked up in the early 1990s and peaked 
in 1997, with privatization revenues of $10 billion. There was a steep decline in 
privatization revenues in 1998 ($1.5 billion), but this increased to $5.5billion in 1999, 
and nearly $11 billion in 2000. The region raised $66 billion or 13% (Figure 4) of total 
privatization proceeds from 420 transactions between 1988 and 2003. Malaysia,
Indonesia, and China were the three top privatizers during the 1990s. It should be noted 
that China alone accounted for nearly 60% of the regional proceeds in the 1990s, but this 
increased to nearly 80% between 2000 and 2003. China’s privatization revenues of over 
$8 billion make it the top revenue earner among developing countries between 2000 and 
2003, as a result of divestiture in the telecommunications, energy, and manufacturing 
sectors.
South Asia
South Asia accounted for nearly $16 billion or 5% of total developing countries’ 
privatization proceeds from 390 transactions between 1988 and 2003 (Figure 5). 
Privatization in South Asia peaked in 1994 with revenues of nearly $3 billion. India and 
Pakistan accounted for 75% and 19% respectively of the South Asian privatization 
proceeds. India is one of the few countries that have been consistent with its privatization 
program and currently, it is one of the top ten privatizers, as generated revenues reached 
over $2 billion between 2000 and 2003. Indian’s privatization proceeds were largely from
17
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minority share sales in banking, oil, and gas with only a few recent sales involving the 
manufacturing and telecommunications sectors.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 4 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa had the second largest number of transactions 
(27%) after Latin America, but it generated the least proceeds from privatization (4%) in 
developing countries between 1988 and 2003. This is due to the fact that most of the 
SOEs sold, were low-valued firms in competitive sectors (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002;
Kikeri and Kolo, 2005; Nellis, 2003). Of the over $11 billion of African privatization 
revenues raised between 1990 and 2003, nearly a third was generated by a handful of 
privatizations in South Africa (Nellis, 2003). Another 33% came from sales in a group of 
four countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ivory Coast). Some 26 African countries 
have privatized under $1 billion over the same period. The privatization activity has also 
been concentrated in a few sectors, including telecommunications (South Africa), mining 
(Ghana and Zambia), and oil fields (Nigeria).
Middle East and North African Countries
The Middle East and North African Countries generated nearly $19 billion or 6% of total 
developing country proceeds (Figure 3) from 288 transactions or 9% of developing 
country transactions. Significant privatization activity was concentrated in three 
countries: Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. These three countries accounted for nearly 90% 
of total regional proceeds. Transactions in both Morocco and Egypt were mainly in 
manufacturing; however, Morocco’s privatization was more diversified with transactions
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in oil refining and banking. Since the year 2000, however, the telecommunications sector 
has been the main source of privatization revenues. The partial sale of Jordan Telecom 
for over $500 million and the partial sale of Saudi Telecom for $4 billion have made the 
telecommunications’ sector the region’s leading revenue generator since 2000.
Sectoral Distribution of Privatization
Various regions of the developing world differ not only in the level of privatization 
activity, but also in the sectors privatized. Between 1988 and 1994 manufacturing and 
infrastructure accounted for over 80% of privatization proceeds (16% for financial 
services, 31% for manufacturing and 36% for infrastructure). After 1994, however, the 
shares of manufacturing, energy, and primary sectors either declined or remained stable, 
while that of financial services and infrastructure increased substantially. As a result, by 
the end of 2003, the share of infrastructure proceeds accounted for nearly 50%, even as 
manufacturing decreased from 31% in the early 1990s to 16% by 2003.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure related proceeds come from transport, telecommunications, water and 
sewage, natural gas transmission and distribution, electricity generation, transmission, 
and distribution. Between 1988 and 1994, infrastructure proceeds reached nearly $40 
billion, but this increased to over $200 billion in 2003. Infrastructure’s share increased 
from 36% by the end of 1994 to 50% in 2003. Figure 7 shows that since the 1990s, 
infrastructure has generated the highest proportion of privatization proceeds in 
developing countries, reaching its peak in 1998. Telecommunications and power make up
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the bulk of the infrastructural activity, accounting for 50% and 36% respectively between 
1988 and 2003.
Figure 7: Sectoral Distribution of Privatization Proceeds, 1988 - 2003
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Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005).
Financial Services
From a slow start in the late 1980s, proceeds from the financial sector increased in the 
1990s but declined between 1994 and 1998 (Figure 7). From a little under $20 billion by 
the end of 1994, proceeds rose to over $50 billion at the end of 2003. The financial sector 
proceeds are generated from real estate, banking, insurance, and financial service firms, 
which account for nearly 90% of the financial sector proceeds. The financial sector 
revenues seem to be concentrated in a few developing countries: Mexico and Brazil in
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Latin America; China, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in East Asia; Pakistan in 
South Asia; and Nigeria, Uganda, and South Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Manufacturing
Figure 8 shows that the most popular sector privatized in the developing countries has 
been the manufacturing sector, accounting for 61% of all transactions between 1988 and 
2003 (Figures 8 and 9). Manufacturing’s sharpest increase occurred between 1991 and 
1994 after which it declined through the rest of the 1990s, but it is still one of the major 
sectors being privatized in developing countries.
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Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005).
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The revenues generated from manufacturing, however, declined from 31% in the early 
1990s to 16% by the end of 2003 (Figure 7). The largest transactions in manufacturing 
were in steel, cement, and fertilizer, with Asian countries being the most active in this 
sector.




□  M anufacturing & S erv ices
■  O ther
■  Primary
Source: World Bank Privatization Database (2005)
Primary Sector
The primary sector includes the extraction of metals and minerals. Proceeds from this 
sector declined slightly from 4% in the early 1990s to 3.46% by the end of 2003. 
Revenues from this sector have been concentrated in a few countries in Latin America 
(Brazil and Mexico), Asia (China and India), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Zambia, 
and Mozambique).
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Energy
Proceeds from the energy sector include revenues from extraction and refinement of 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas and petrochemicals). Revenues from energy accounted for 
12% of privatization proceeds in developing countries by 1994, but had increased slightly 
to 14 % by the end of 2003. Transactions over the period were concentrated in few 
countries - Argentina, Brazil, China, and South Africa
The discussion above shows that for the developing countries as a whole 
privatization activity peaked at the end of 1998 and dropped off in the late 1990s but 
increased slightly after 2000. Further, while many developing countries engaged in 
ambitious privatization programs, proceeds are concentrated in a few countries. Brazil, 
Argentina, and Mexico dominated the 1990s (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005).
Extent of Government Ownership
The high levels of privatization activity might suggest that government ownership has 
declined over the years. Kikeri and Kolo (2005) note that although a systematic 
assessment of SOE activity in GDP, investment, and domestic credit is difficult because 
of data constraints, anecdotal evidence suggests that government involvement in 
economic activity in most developing countries is still appreciable. Hence, while 
privatization activity has increased all over the developing world, at the aggregate level it 
appears to be small relative to the stock of SOEs.
Between 1980 and 1997, SOEs activities as a percentage of GDP decreased from 
about 11 to 5 percent in middle income countries and from 15 to 3 percent in low income 
countries (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1999). Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003)
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observe that these averages might mask the regional variations in the size and economic 
importance of the remaining state-owned production. For example, in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, only a few governments have openly adopted an explicitly state-owned 
divestment strategy. The African privatization effort has been significant in only a 
handful of countries and state production still accounts for over 15% of GDP in the 
region. Similarly, government economic role remains large in the Middle East and North 
African countries with the private sector accounting on average for less than 50% of GDP 
in the region (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005). In Asia, China for example, has only recently 
committed to privatize all but the largest state enterprises; while in India nearly 43% of 
country’s capital stock is being owned by the state (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003). 
The review of privatization trends in the developing world suggests that after nearly 15 
years of privatization programs, government ownership is still prevalent in many of the 
developing countries. The indication is that while privatization has reduced government 
ownership in the economy of most developing countries, it has not reduced it to 
insignificant levels. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literature 
cited for and against privatization.




This section presents an overview of the theories of privatization, the link between 
privatization and economic growth and income inequality, and finally discusses the 
empirical literature on privatization.
Theories of Privatization
Though many theories have been used to support the privatization agenda, three theories 
have stood out over the past several years. These are: Property Rights theory, Public 
Choice theory, and Principal Agent theory. The basic assumption of the privatization 
theories is that free market forces enhance efficiency in organizations. Henig (1989), for 
example, notes that the privatization theories have served to advance the privatization 
movement in two ways. First, they served to refurbish a laissez faire philosophy that was 
politically past its prime especially in the developing world. Henig (1989) claims that by 
applying economic principles to explain government behavior (failure), the privatization 
theories provided a means to undercut the presumption that an expanded governmental 
apparatus could best carry out the pursuit of a widely shared public goal. Second, the 
theories furthered the privatization movement by redefining preexisting local government 
practices, as the theories represented a coherent, pragmatic and nonpartisan philosophy 
rather than the advancement of a political program to disassemble the state. Each of these 
theories will now be discussed in detail.
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Property Rights Theory
The property rights literature is quite diverse, but it is characterized by a common 
emphasis on the interconnectedness of ownership rights, incentives, and economic 
behavior (Commander and Killick (1988). Property rights theory is therefore concerned 
with maximizing the utility function of managers subject to the limits established by the 
existing organization. Property rights have been defined in a variety of ways. Alchian 
(1965) defines property rights as having three characteristics: exclusivity of rights to the 
choice of use of a resource; exclusivity of rights to the services of a resource; and 
the rights to exchange the resource at mutually aggreable terms.
On the other hand, Demetz (1967) defines a property right as an instrument of 
society, which derives its significance from the fact that it helps an individual form those 
expectations which he or she can reasonably hold in dealings with others. These 
expectations find expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society. An owner of 
property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him or her to act in particular 
ways. In accordance with this view, Starr (1988) asserts that the theory of property rights 
specifies the social and economic relations that people must observe with respect to the 
allocation of resources, taking into consideration both the benefits owners can enjoy and 
the harm they cause to others.
Similarly, Hill and Kamer (1996) refer to property rights as the control over 
assets and argued that managers have such control in that they determine the day to day 
allocation of inputs and production of the firm. From an institutional theory perspective, 
however, Anderson and Hill (1975) assert that property rights creation is an economic 
activity very much like the production of other goods and services, which cannot be
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imposed upon the system but develop in response to incentives. For example, in the case 
of the United States, Hill and Kamer (1996) explain that the property rights to water, 
livestock, and land, were in response to both supply and demand conditions. When these 
resources were not particularly valuable, little effort was made in defining and enforcing 
rights, but when population pressure and increased demand for agricultural products 
made property rights more valuable, greater effort was made in defending and enforcing 
these rights. This is because property rights give individual owners “residual claims” on 
the assets of private enterprise (Hanke, 1987). Residual claims refer to the ability to use 
an asset, change it in form, and to transfer all or sell some of these rights (Starr, 1988). 
Soto (1996) has described property rights as the ‘missing ingredient’ needed to make 
markets work. This is because the creation of property rights is directly linked to the 
incentive structure of the system, as well defined and enforced rights will develop more 
rapidly if decision makers can capture the returns from such rights (Hill and Kamer, 
1996).
The discussion above suggests that individuals tend to their property better when 
there are gains to be made. As far back as 1776, Adam Smith wrote in the “Wealth of 
Nations” that people are more prodigal with the wealth of others than with their own. 
Accordingly, from the property rights perspective, public enterprises are expected to be 
less efficient compared to private firms because public enterprises are owned by 
individuals who have no residual claim (SOEs shares cannot be sold by citizens) on the 
assets of the public organizations (Megginson, 2005). As Aharoni (1982, p. 69) puts it, 
the “ .. . .SOE is an agent without a principal."
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The main thesis of the property rights theorists is that the state sector’s 
inefficiency results from situations in which no individual or group has a clear stake in 
the assets of the enterprise (Abdul, 2000). This means that in public enterprises, property 
rights are neither exclusive nor transferable. In this context, the probability that the public 
assets would be mismanaged might be high (Furobotn and Perjovich, 1972). This review 
demonstrates that property rights theory diverges from the classical theory of the firm by 
rejecting the firm as the unit of analysis, and focuses instead on the role of individual 
decision makers within the organization. The more completely the rights over resources 
are allocated to the decision maker, the stronger are the incentives to use and preserve 
those resources efficiently. Accordingly, privatization associated with concentration of 
property rights is expected to lead to improved efficiency.
Principal-Agent Theory
The fundamental argument for the superiority of the private enterprise in terms of its 
efficiency is based on the fact that as residual claimants to a firm’s revenues, the owners 
are motivated to behave efficiently. In the modem firm, however, there is attenuation of 
property rights as in SOEs, because ownership is separated from managerial control in 
most big corporations. There is therefore a principal-agent relationship under which one 
or more persons (principal (s) or the body of diffuse shareholders) can engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. The agency relationship therefore results in agency 
costs, which consists of monitoring expenditures by the principals, bonding payments by 
the agents, and residual losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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Agency theorists argue that managers in both private and SOEs are assumed to 
maximize their own utility rather than that of the organization or its owners. However, 
the problem is reduced in private firms through external mechanisms (corporate control) 
and internal mechanisms through boards of directors and incentives for managers 
(Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Furobotn and Pejovich, 1972; Skipke, 2001; Tandon,
1995,1997). Further, Furobotn and Pejovich (1972) claim that the extent of managers' 
pursuit of their own interests will also be constrained by managers’ own cost-benefit 
calculations in terms of: market valuation; managerial Incentives; and competition among 
managers. This means that in so far as stock price reflects the present value of the 
expected future consequences of managerial policies, it would be expected that managers 
would be careful with respect to maximizing their own value rather than the firm’s value. 
As a result, owners’ freedom to sell shares in a market that reflect the capitalized value of 
current managerial decision tends to set limits on the power of managers to pursue their 
own objective at the expense of profit maximization (Furobotn and Perjovich, 1972, p. 
1150).
Further, Fama (1980), in his analysis of the agency problems, argues that the 
separation of ownership from control can be an efficient form of organization relative to 
organizations in which the risk-bearing and decision-making functions are combined. 
Fama (1980) observes that a firm is usually disciplined by competition from other firms, 
which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the 
entire team and its members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its 
managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their 
services, both inside and outside the firm.
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Additionally, Agency theory indicates that because private firms have clearer 
goals, it is easier for owners (principals) to hold managers (agents) accountable 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) and therefore managers perform 
better in private firms than in SOEs. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Sheshinski and 
Lopez-Calva (1999) also claim that political interference distorts the objectives and 
constraints faced by public managers, which results in poor choices of production. 
Similarly, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) describe agency conflicts as the main 
source of inefficiencies of SOEs. This means that privatization will tend to raise the cost 
to politicians in influencing firms, since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them 
to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the SOE 
(Boycko et ah, 1996).
Public Choice Theory
Underlying the case for privatization is the view that there is government failure, in the 
sense that public policy is likely to operate in ways that impede the efficient functioning 
of markets (Yarrow, 1999). Government failure or the public choice argument, according 
to Ghosh (2001) is the main pillar of the neoclassical counter-revolution to the 
interventionist state with unlimited power. Government failure refers to the failure of 
government policies to allocate resources efficiently, to redistribute them in a well- 
targeted manner, and to stabilize the economy in the period of stagflation (Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 2000). The basic assumption of public choice theory is that humans are 
egoistic, rational, utility maximizers (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
The principle of utility maximization according to the public choice perspective 
dominates human behavior both in the marketplace and in politics (Abu Shair, 1997;
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Dye, 2000; Hodge, 2000). As a result, the inefficiency of state firms is attributed to 
politicians and bureaucrats pursuing their own well specified objectives such as excess 
labor spending which conflicts with the efficient operations of SOEs (Boycko et al., 
1996). Buchanan (1972) asserts that politicians in interfering in the economic activity are 
more interested in winning votes than promoting efficiency in SOEs. This is due to the 
fact that the policy environments in which firms operate are functions of the incentive 
structures faced by policy makers, which depend on a range of political factors including 
interest group pressure and public opinion. This means that an increasingly larger share 
of government output is designed to benefit subgroups of the populace at the expense of 
the general public.
Further, Niskanen (1971) asserts that utility maximizing bureaucrats receive 
utility from the size of the budget they manage. Consequently, lacking the incentive of 
the profit maximizing firm and with no clear objectives, the bureaucrat is likely to seek 
the budget size which maximizes his utility, which, as Niskanen (1971) claims is greater 
than efficient size. Niskanen’s view is in contrast to the Weberian view of bureaucrats as 
“neutered eunuchs” (Niskanen, 1994). Borcherding (1977) also argues that only about 
half of the increase in real government spending can be explained by changes in the 
standard economic variables of relative price, relative income, and population. The other 
half, he argued is attributed to the role of the bureaucracy, which in most cases 
maximizes its own utility rather than the public’s interest in the decision making process. 
Buchanan (1977) echoes a similar view in his assertion that bureaucrats’ interests lie in 
an expanding governmental sector and especially one that expands the number of 
employees. Bush and Mackay (1977) in explaining the “politics for profit” and “conflict
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of interest” of politicians and bureaucrats, argue that the maximizing behavior of 
bureaucrats generates forces that cause excessive public sector growth at the expense of 
efficiency.
Another argument against the SOE is the view that SOEs can be used to achieve 
social objectives at the expense of efficiency of the organization. Olson (1982, p. 47), 
argues that a large government sector related to a large SOE share in output is usually 
associated with special interest groups that focus more on redistributing income rather 
than creating it, and in ways that reduce social efficiency and output. This is clearly 
indicated in Okun’s (1975, p. 48) statement that “ . ...any insistence on carving the pie into 
equal slices would shrink the size of the pie.” There is therefore a trade-off between 
efficiency and equity or as Okun (1975, p. 2) puts it, “ . . . .we cannot have our cake of 
market efficiency and share it equally.” This is because redistributive policies that 
attempt to decrease the level of inequality will invariably decrease the efficiency in 
resource allocation, the savings ratio, and labor supply and thereby reduce the growth 
potential (Korpi, 1985). Okun (1975, p. 91) explains his rationale against state 
intervention in the market with the “leaky bucket” concept; which suggests that in the 
process of the bureaucrat or politician carrying the money to the poor, some of the money 
will get lost in transit. The result is that the poor will not receive all the money that is 
taken from the rich. The beneficiaries of the wealth transfer by implication are the 
politicians. Accordingly, what society needs, Okun (1975, p. 3) argues is not equality of 
income, but rather equality of opportunity.
Okun’s (1975) analysis of the leaky bucket is similar to Olson’s (1982) view, 
which suggests that irrespective of coalitions of individuals or firms to affect the
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outcomes and functioning of markets via legislative or organized collusion usually leads 
to lower economic growth. This is due to the fact that only a few people benefit from the 
government intervention in economic activity. Likewise, Mueller (1979) claims that 
increased emphasis on distributional issues due to accumulation of special interest groups 
can increase the divisiveness in a political system and consequently make societies 
ungovernable. Hence, Olson (1982) suggests that special interest organizations and 
collusion reduce efficiency and aggregate income in societies in which they operate and 
make political life divisive. The public choice perspective therefore holds the view that 
the role of the state should be reduced and service delivery where possible should be 
privatized. Consequently, privatization is expected to lead to a change in the goals of the 
firm and the bargaining power of the different actors in the political market and thereby 
increasing the need for efficiency (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Hodge, 2000).
The review of the privatization theories above suggests that SOEs are inefficient 
because of the high transaction cost in protecting and enforcing property rights associated 
with bureaucrats’ and politicians’ inability and in certain cases refusal or fear of losing 
their support base (Abu Shair, 1997; Omran, 2004). Privatization is therefore expected to 
improve the performance of the firm by changing the mechanisms through which 
different institutional arrangements affect the incentives for managing enterprises 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991). Consequently, privatization is expected to lead to allocative 
and productive efficiency and hence increased output in the economy.
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Privatization, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality
There are many ways in which privatization may exert a positive effect on economic 
growth and income inequality. Three of these ways are discussed below. First, if 
privatization was sufficiently extensive and had efficiency inducing effects, the 
contribution of improved performance could be detected at the macroeconomic level 
(Cook and Uchida, 2003). As noted by Bennett et al. (2004), if the positive effects of 
privatization on the financial performance and productivity of firms that are predicted by 
microeconomic theory are realized, these effects should have a macroeconomic lag 
leading to an increase in economic growth. This is because market specialization and the 
resulting efficiency of resource use is the basis of economic growth (Olbeter, 1994).
Likewise, Berg and Berg (1997) argue that in the presence of competition, 
enterprise efficiency associated with privatization is expected to lead to increased 
efficiency in the entire economy through competitive markets and better allocation of 
resources across different firms and sectors of the economy. This is because competition 
has the potential to radically change the economy in such a way that some firms will 
grow exponentially while others wither away and some services will fail while others 
thrive. According to Olbeter (1994), competition forces firms to continually innovate, 
improve efficiency, and provide high quality service. The result is that consumers 
economy-wide will benefit from less expensive, higher quality, and more innovative 
services.
Second, the allocative and productive efficiency associated with privatization will 
help to reduce public sector debt and free public resources for investment in 
infrastructure and social programs to promote economic growth and reduce poverty
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(Nellis, 1994). Aghion and Schankerman (1999), for example, argue that the increased 
financial performance and productivity of firms might result in greater revenue for the 
government and its ability to spend on infrastructure, which would have a potential 
positive impact on aggregate productivity. The fiscal impact of privatization may also 
have favorable distributive consequences by aiding macroeconomic stabilization and 
allowing a shift in spending away from expensive debt service obligations towards 
increased social spending targeted more directly at the poor (Mckenzie and Mookherjee, 
2002). Similarly, Ramanadham (1988) notes that revenues generated from privatization 
can be invested in infrastructural development and basic industries, which have 
significant distributional outcomes.
Finally, the privatization process may lead to increased investment and 
stimulation of economic growth for the entire economy (Berg and Berg, 1997). Davis et 
al. (2000) indicate that markets and investors regard privatization as a positive signal of 
the political likelihood that a government will stick with its overall reform program, and 
therefore privatization may be associated with high rates of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The FDI literature indicate that developing countries experienced a sharp increase 
in the average ratio of FDI to total investment during the 1990s, which was due mainly to 
large scale privatization programs especially in infrastructure (Kirkpatrick, Parker, and 
Zhang, 2006; Palmade and Anayiolas, 2004).
Foreign investment has positive spillovers to the entire economy in terms of 
improved technology, superior marketing and management skills, and access to 
international production networks (Kobrin, 2005; Kumar and Pradhan, 2002; Narula and 
Portelli, 2004; Sylwester, 2005). More than 50 years ago, Lewis (1948) argued that the
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export of capital to developing countries promotes growth by creating industries, 
transferring technology, and fostering a modem perspective in the local economy. 
Accordingly, privatization that brings in foreign direct investment could potentially have 
multiple positive effects on the growth of developing countries (Filipovic, 2005). The 
discussion above suggests the following hypotheses:
HI: Privatization is positively correlated with economic growth. 
H2: Privatization is positively correlated with income distribution. 
Criticisms of the Theoretical Arguments
There are many criticisms against the privatization theories. First, is the fact that basing 
the privatization idea solely on economic efficiency leads the discussion to what 
Ikenberry (1990, p. 106) describes as “economic reductionism.” In contrast to the 
privatization theories outlined above, Avishur (2000), Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2003), and 
Laffont and Meleu (1999) have argued for a positive theory of privatization to explain the 
rationale for the privatization process. These authors argue that governments in most 
developing countries divest their SOEs only when it is politically desirable for them to do 
so.
The positive theory perspective indicates that privatization occurs only when 
politicians can fetch enough shares in the newly created firms to compensate for the 
private benefits they were deriving from the SOEs. Banerjee and Munger (2004) claim 
that the privatization decision is based on the “net political benefits” defined as the 
difference between the benefits and costs of divestiture from the perspective of the
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political elites. Privatization therefore occurs only when the present value of political 
benefits from the efficiency gains are higher than the cost of redistribution (Clarke and 
Cull, 2002). This argument is further echoed by Bomer (2004) who argues that the 
success of privatization is dependent on efficient incentives of the political leadership.
Dinavo (1995) and Ramamurti (2000), for example, suggest that politics play the 
most significant role in deciding whether to privatize or not to privatize. Biais and Perotti 
(2002) claim that in most countries privatization process has taken place in a 
“Machiavellian fashion”, a strategic policy to maintain power. Similarly, Stephan III 
(1996) argues that rent-seeking and political patronages were the prime motivating 
factors for privatization and other reforms in the former soviet type economies.
The discussion above indicates that in implementing privatization policy, 
governments may have interests other than productive efficiency especially in the context 
of the developing world. Starr (1988) asserts that privatization must not be seen only as a 
technical instrument of policy to achieve productive efficiency but also as a political 
measure of symbolic consequence. This argument is supported by Henig’s (1989) claim 
that the exclusive focus on economic forces obscures the intensely political nature of the 
privatization process. Henig (1989) argues that privatization initiatives are political 
because they redistribute costs and benefits among diverse and competing groups in 
society.
Second, there is theoretical and empirical evidence that show that efficiency is an 
outcome of the market structure rather than a change of ownership per se. Mansoor 
(1988) claims that significant efficiency gains from privatization are more likely to come 
from measures to increase competition than an ownership change, and that ownership is
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neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency gains. Similarly, Shapiro and Willig (1990) 
and Tandon (1995) argue that without competition there will be no difference between 
the private and public enterprises. This view is supported by Mendez and Glomm (2004), 
who examined theoretically how privatization and deregulation of production of 
intermediate products influence capital accumulation. The authors used three model 
specifications in the analysis: public monopoly under government control, private 
monopoly, and one where there is competition. The authors report that the benefits of 
state-to-market transitions are mostly due to increased competition on the deregulated 
market and that privatization of state enterprises by itself is not likely to generate 
significant changes in the economy. More importantly, Mendez and Glomm (2004) show 
that the model predicts that for high enough levels of public investment, a public 
monopoly would be preferred to a private monopoly in terms of the resulting aggregate 
income level.
Mendez and Glomm’s (2004) finding is consistent with Mansoor’s (1988) 
argument that the transfer of a public monopoly to the private sector with its monopoly 
power kept intact may lead to a worsening of the budgetary position. Likewise, Kay and 
Thompson (1986), in a study of the privatization process in the United Kingdom claim 
that private firms are not necessarily intrinsically more efficient but that market pressures 
are more effective at weeding out poorly performing firms in the private sector than in 
the public sector. Kay and Thompson (1986) observe that there are efficient and 
inefficient private enterprises as there are in the public sector. However, they argue that if 
the product market is competitive, lower efficiency is penalized by small market share
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and low profits. At the same time if capital market is effective, this in turn leads to a 
withdrawal from the industry by unsuccessful firms.
Consequently, market disciplines do more to improve the private sector than the 
public sector, which indicates that it is not ownership, but rather the interaction of 
ownership and competition that promotes efficiency. This argument is supported 
empirically by Savas’ (1977) study of refuse collection in the United States, which shows 
that where competition was introduced between public and private suppliers, the 
difference in costs between the two sectors was largely eliminated in a short period of 
time.
Other studies also show that in some particular industries (e.g., 
telecommunications), when there is no competition or the necessary regulatory 
framework, privatization may have a negative effect on performance (Wallsten, 2001).
As noted by Brett (1988), the virtues of the market in enforcing efficiency do not stem 
from the fact that ownership is private but from the fact that resource allocation is 
competitive. Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) also claim that though the privatization 
theories indicate privatization is expected to lead to improved efficiency, on average the 
variance across real world empirical tests is substantial. They explain that the variance is 
due to the fact that in imperfectly competitive environments, efficiency appears to depend 
more on competition and regulation than on ownership. Shapiro and Willig (1990), on the 
other hand, note that the form of ownership may matter only when there is some private 
noncontractible information involved.
Thirdly, other authors (Adam et al., 1992; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 2003) argue that 
because of market failures, SOEs may produce socially efficient results, which maximize
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social welfare, where private managers will maximize private profits and welfare. 
Likewise, Shirley and Walsh (2001) note that in developing nations and transition 
economies, monopolies abound because of pervasive market failures, lack of information 
and high entry costs. Further, SOEs can be used to pursue other social objectives beyond 
that of addressing market failures, including: reducing income inequality; increasing 
employment; and promoting regional development (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 2003).
On the other hand, Vemon-Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) assert that SOEs’ 
problems do not arise from ownership but from the lack of clear goals and objectives as 
well as inappropriate control, motivation, and reward systems. Similarly, Brett (1988) 
claims that the failure of the state to control its own servants should not be seen as an 
economic problem to be solved by privatization, but rather as a political problem to be 
resolved by improving the political and administrative mechanisms which have failed. 
Further, Cowan (1990), argues that the turn to privatization is a reflection of a change in 
the value structure of western democracies that is not necessarily transferable to 
developing countries.
Finally, many other authors indicate that the probity and competence of 
government is a crucial factor in ensuring the success of privatization (Meredith, 2005; 
Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Consequently, some of these authors promote the idea of 
reform or revitalization of SOEs rather than privatization especially in the developing 
countries where there is lack of well established institutional infrastructure, weak private 
sector, poor public sector government, corruption and cronyism. Likewise, Flarris and 
Lye (2001) argue that given the large costs associated with privatization, reforms may be 
more desirable than privatization. Revitalization or reform of SOEs is based on the
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assumption that privatization is only appropriate when there is competition and 
institutional capacity to regulate markets. Further, the revitalization perspective indicates 
that since performance is more a function of institutional design and resource allocation 
process than of ownership, it will be more appropriate to make SOEs more autonomous 
and subjective to competitive pressures and market discipline (Aharoni, 1986).
The success of revitalization is dependent on the ability to immunize SOEs from 
political interferences by choosing the right managers, giving them the right incentives, 
and allowing them to influence results and achieve them. Aharoni (1986), however, notes 
that the suggested reforms may indeed be applicable in more established democracies. 
Similar to Aharoni’s (1986) view is Cook and Kirkpatrick’s (1988) argument that since 
both privatization and the opening up of the public sector to domestic and international 
competition have not achieved their stated objectives, the best alternative to public sector 
efficiency and performance would be a focus on improvements in the internal 
management of the public sector.
The discussion above suggests that the question to be asked is not whether the 
private sector is more efficient than the public sector or vice versa. Rather, the issue that 
needs to be addressed is identifying which of the two sectors (private or public) is more 
appropriate in the production of a particular service and where necessary for the private 
and public sectors to be involved in partnerships to produce and deliver goods and 
services. As Savas (2000) has noted, the problem is not public versus private ownership, 
but rather, monopoly versus competition. Similarly, Brett (1988) asserts that if indeed 
monopoly is the central problem, then progress can only be made by trying to develop 
methods to deal with the problem wherever it exists whether in the public or private
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sectors. Brett (1988) argues that if careful analysis is not done to take into account valid
insights of both paradigms (private and government ownership), the debate will be
continually shifting from one paradigm to the other. Further, Brett (1988, p.63) states:
What is needed therefore is a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
discipline of public administration, long associated with the 
mechanistic and formalistic development of the classical Weberian 
principles of formally rational bureaucratic organization. Instead 
we need a radical analysis of the way in which public authority can 
be organized in order to eliminate the barriers behind which 
officialdom has always been able to hide, to ensure that they are 
rewarded for performance and not simply for occupying positions 
and doing what they are told. And to guarantee that they will not 
use the monopoly power derived from the state to exclude creative 
alternatives which might threaten their ability to go on doing things 
that they find most easy and comfortable.
Finally, Starr (1988) asserts that the choice is not public or private but rather 
which of the many possible mixed public-private structures works best. Obviously, we 
cannot simply make a choice between state and market, because, separating the two 
produces not only inadequate social science, but disastrous policy presentation in the real 
world (Brett, 1988). Accordingly, portraying privatization primarily as an economic 
process that is implemented in response to fiscal constraints fails to acknowledge the 
considerable range of alternatives open to government actors to revitalize SOEs and the 
economy as a whole. In the next section, we discuss the privatization empirical literature.
Empirical Studies
The privatization empirical literature can be divided into three main groups: firm-level, 
industry-level, and country-level studies. Each will now be discussed in detail.
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Firm-Level studies
The firm-level impact of privatization is the most studied (Boubakari and Cosset, 1998, 
1999; Boubakari et al., 2001; Megginson et al., 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
Megginson et al. (1994) compared the pre and post financial operating performance of 61 
firms from 18 countries between 1961 and 990. The authors report that privatization 
resulted in increased profitability, real sales and operating efficiency. More importantly, 
the authors report an increase in median and mean employment rates. However, the 
authors did not find significant improvements for non-OECD countries. The main 
limitation of the study is its small sample size involving only six developing countries. 
Further, as Boubakari and Cosset (1998) noted, most of the firms had their headquarters 
in a developed country, and hence the sample of firms studied is not representative of the 
developing world.
In a later review of the privatization literature on transition economies, OECD 
countries and non-transition developing economies, Megginson and Netter (2001) report 
that privatization has significant positive effects on firm-level performance. The study 
finds privatization’s effect on employment to be ambiguous. Boubakari and Cosset’s
(1998) study was a departure from that of Megginson et al.’s (1994) in that all the firms 
were headquartered in a developing country. Boubakari and Cosset’s (1998) study 
included 79 firms from 21 developing countries between the years of 1980 and 1992. The 
authors report that newly privatized firms exhibit significant increases in profitability, 
total dividends, operating efficiency and employment levels.
Interestingly, the authors also showed that privatization yields greater benefits for 
companies operating in developing countries with high per capita income than those with
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low per capita income. In contrast to Boubakari and Cosset (1998), the Boubakari and 
Cosset’s (1999) study of 16 privatized firms in five African countries indicate that 
although profitability and operational performance improved after privatization, 
efficiency as well as output (measured by real sales) decreased slightly but not 
significantly while capital expenditures rose significantly after privatization.
On the other hand, recent firm-level empirical studies in the developing countries 
indicate that the change of ownership per se may not be the prime indicator of improved 
performance. For example, Boubakari et al. (2001) in studying the impact of 201 
privatized firms from 32 developing countries reported that improved efficiency of firms 
was associated with countries in which their stock markets and property rights were 
highly developed. This finding supports the view that allocative efficiency is more a 
function of market structure rather than ownership (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988).
Industry-Level Studies
Water and telecommunications sectors are the two most studied industries in the 
developing world. Li and Xu (2002) claim that in 1980 less than 2% of the 
telecommunications firms in 167 countries were privatized, but the number of privatized 
telecommunications firms increased to nearly 42% in the 1990s. Li and Xu (2002) further 
assert that the telecommunications industry in most countries is the fastest growing 
industry because it offers positive externalities to other industries. This is primarily due to 
reduction in the transaction cost for businesses.
The significance of the telecommunications industry in promoting economic 
growth was studied in detail by Roller and Waverman (2001). The authors jointly
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estimated a micromodel for telecommunications investment with a macro production 
function and report that there is a significant positive causal link between 
telecommunication infrastructure and economic growth. The impact of privatization of 
the telecommunications sector, however, is mixed. While Ros (1999) asserts that 
privatization of telecommunications infrastructure is positively correlated with network 
expansion, Wallsten found the opposite in a 2001 study.
Ros’ (1999) study is based on data for 110 developing and developed countries 
between 1986 and 1995. Using panel data with fixed-effects estimation technique to 
control for unobserved effects in their model, the authors found that privatization was 
positively correlated with network expansion. The study indicates that where there was at 
least 50% private ownership in the telecom firm, teledensity levels (service coverage) and 
output growth rates improved significantly. Though both competition and privatization 
raise efficiency, Ros (1999) asserts that privatization by itself, is sufficient to generate 
efficiency gains in network expansion. An interesting finding of this study was the lack 
of evidence that privatization increases network expansion or efficiency in countries with 
per capita income of less than $10, 000. However, it is questionable as to whether Ros’
(1999) study can be generalized to all developing countries as only three countries in the 
study’s sample have a per capita income in excess of $10, 000 (Table 6A in Appendix).
Unlike Ros’ (1999) study, the Wallsten (2001) study focused on 
telecommunications firms from developing countries (14 African and 16 Latin American 
countries) between 1984 and 1997. Using panel data and fixed-effects regression 
techniques, the author found privatization to be negatively correlated with mainline 
penetration and connection capacity. However, privatization in the midst of competition
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and regulatory framework was positively correlated with the number of per capita 
mainline phones, payphones, connection capacity and a decrease in the price of local 
calls.
Like telecommunications privatization, the impact of privatization of water 
provision has also been mixed. While Galiani et al. (2005) claim that privatization of 
water services resulted in improved performance, Bayliss (2002a) reports otherwise. 
Galiani et al. (2005) studied the privatization of water services in Argentina in the 1990s 
and found that privatization improved performance. The performance measure employed 
was the number of deaths caused by water borne diseases, which fell by 8%, an effect 
that was largest (26%) in the poorest areas. A robust check on their finding revealed that 
while privatization was associated with significant reductions in deaths from infectious 
and parasitic diseases, it was uncorrelated with deaths from causes unrelated to water 
conditions.
On the other hand, Bayliss (2002a), in analyzing the impact of privatization of 
water services in 13 Sub-Saharan African countries reports that there was no significant 
improvement in performance. In Kenya and South Africa for example, privatization 
contracts were terminated because of irregularities which came to light following protests 
from civil society. Bayliss (2002a), however, notes that the lack of significant 
improvements after privatization in the region could be attributed to the macroeconomic 
instability and the poor institutional and regulatory conditions.
Like the firm-level studies, the results of the industry-level studies seem to 
suggest that that the change of ownership per se (in the absence of competition) from the
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public to private sector does not necessarily lead to improved efficiency as indicated by 
property rights, agency, and public choice theories.
Country-Level Studies
The empirical studies that examine the economy-wide effects of privatization as in the 
firm and industry levels have been inconclusive. For example, Barnett (2000), Davis et 
al. (2000) and Plane (1997) claim that privatization has a significant positive impact on 
economic growth, while Cook and Uchida (2003), Filipovic (2005), and Yoder et al. 
(1991) make claims to the contrary.
Barnett (2000) studied the relationship between privatization and measures of 
fiscal and macroeconomic performance. The study involved 18 countries, 12 of which 
were developing countries. The results show privatization to be positively correlated with 
an improvement in macroeconomic performance, which was manifested in higher GDP 
growth and lower unemployment. Further, a privatization of 1% of GDP was associated 
with an increase in the real GDP growth rate of 0.4% -  0.5%. Similar to the Barnett
(2000) study, Plane (1997) employed Probit and Tobit estimation techniques to study 35 
developing countries between 1984 and 1992 and found a significant positive effect for 
privatization on economic growth. The findings of the study indicate that the positive 
economic effect was stronger when privatization was accompanied by institutional 
reforms. On average institutional reform increased economic growth from 0.8% to 1.5% 
between the sub-periods 1984-1988 and 1988-1992.
On the contrary, Cook and Uchida (2003) found a negative correlation between 
privatization and economic growth for 63 developing countries. They used the total
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
proceeds from privatization between 1988 and 1997 as a share of Gross Domestic 
Product. Controlling for variables that might interfere with the impact of privatization 
(e.g., the size of government budget deficit and World Bank loans) the authors report a 
negative, but fragile partial correlation between privatization and economic growth. 
However, a robust negative correlation was found for 61 countries, when two outliers 
(Malaysia and Singapore) were excluded from the study sample. Similarly, Filipovic 
(2005) reports a negative but insignificant correlation between privatization and 
economic growth in a study of 92 developing countries between 1990 and 2000. This 
result is similar to that reported by Yoder et al. (1991) who found a negative correlation 
between privatization and the economic development indicators. However, the Yoder et 
al. (1991) study differs from Cook and Uchida (2003) and the other studies, as it focused 
on economic development rather than economic growth.
Yoder et al.’s (1991) study is the only study that the author is aware of that deals 
specifically with the issue of privatization and economic development (dealing with 
social and economic indicators). Their study was based on the premise that privatization 
studies must go beyond economic growth or the use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or 
Gross National Product (GNP) in assessing development. Consequently, they employed a 
comprehensive index of development, including GNP per capita income, life expectancy 
at birth, literacy rate, infant mortality rate, income distributions and GNP growth rates. 
Their study involved 45 countries (17 from Sub -  Saharan Africa) in a cross sectional 
design using the private sector level of participation in 1980 or 1981 as the independent 
variable and development index (GNP per capita income, life expectancy at birth, literacy
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rate, infant mortality rate, income distributions and GNP growth rates) for 1986 as the 
dependent variable.
The authors divided the 45 countries into three income groupings: low- 
income (GNP of less than $450), lower-middle income (GNP between $451-1800), and 
upper middle income (GNP between $1801-7500), and found that the development 
indicators were highly correlated with income groupings. Further, the authors show that 
there was no statistically significant relationship between the size of the private sector 
and any of the development indicators. However, the study had many methodological 
limitations, including the use of private sector participation as a measure of privatization 
and the use of simple correlation design that does not take into account other factors that 
may affect the growth process. The authors did acknowledge these shortcomings and 
recommended the need for further research.
Clarke and Wallsten (2002) undertook a cross-country study that examined the 
impact of privatization on social welfare. Clarke and Wallsten (2002) used household 
data from around the world to examine the performance of public utilities in meeting 
universal service obligations and the impacts of reform. They found that state monopolies 
everywhere except in Eastern Europe failed to provide service to the poor and rural 
households. Further, they argue that privatization did not harm the poor and rural 
consumers, rather and in many cases privatization has led to improved access to utility 
services. Clarke and Wallsten (2002) argue that even in cases where there were negative 
distributional consequences, these were generally outweighed by increased access and 
better regulatory systems or subsidies aimed at protecting the less favored.
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Like the firm-level and industry-level studies, recent cross-country empirical 
studies in the developing countries indicate that the change of ownership per se may not 
be the prime indicator of improved performance (Boubakari and Cosset, 2004;
Ramamurti, 1999; Zinnes et al., 2001). Zinnes et al. (2001), in their analysis of the impact 
of privatization on economic growth in the transition economies of Eastern Europe make 
the argument that change of ownership is not enough to ensure the success of 
privatization. More importantly, Zinnes et al. (2001) indicate that the mere change of 
ownership from the public to private sector may have a negative impact on the transition 
economies. The study concludes that only when there is “deep privatization”
(privatization associated with institutional reforms) will improved performance be 
assured. Similarly, Boubakari et al. (2005) on studying the impact of privatized firms in 
developing countries, report that improved efficiency of firms was associated with 
countries in which their stock markets were highly developed and also where property 
rights were highly developed.
The empirical studies outlined above as with the previous theoretical review 
indicate that there is no consensus as to the impact of privatization on economic 
development. The next section discusses the limitations of the various studies.
Limitations of the Empirical Literature
Two main problems can be identified with the studies reviewed: methodology and 
measures used in the study (Berthelemy et al., 2004, Bortolotti et al., 2003; Bortolotti and 
Pinotti, 2003; Cook and Uchida, 2001) and the inclusion of all developing countries in
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the regression analysis (Barnett, 2000; Plane 1997, Filipovic, 2005). These limitations 
will now be discussed in detail.
Inclusion of all Developing Countries in the Regression Analysis without 
Controlling for Regional Blocs
The empirical evidence cited for the positive impact of privatization has been that which 
pertains generally to the developing world as a whole (Barnett, 2000; Plane 1997). 
However, Al-Obaidan (2002) argues that the inclusion of countries in the regression 
analysis that are intrinsically different may result in unacceptable statistical bias. Clearly, 
developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia 
exhibit different socioeconomic characteristics. In principle, regression analysis 
necessitates observations that are drawn from a distinct population (Harberger, 1987). 
Blonigen and Wang (2005), for example, in the analysis of FDI on economic growth, 
argued that it is inappropriate to pool together countries of different socioeconomic 
conditions and that the positive correlation between FDI and growth may have arisen 
because most of the studies did not control for regional differences. Accordingly, the 
inclusion of developing countries with different social and cultural characteristics 
requires the regional blocs to be controlled to reduce the problem of omitted variable bias 
associated with geographical differences and other region -specific factors. Controlling 
for the regional blocs to identify the impact of privatization on countries from different 
regions of the developing world is one of the main contributions of this study.
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Measures Used in studying Privatization and Economic Development
The inconsistencies of the impact of privatization on economic performance may be 
attributed to the numerous methodologies and the abundance of measures used to 
represent privatization and measures of performance. Plane (1997) noted that the problem 
with inconsistent empirical results is due to the lack of a conceptual framework -  thus, 
the concept of privatization is not clearly defined. While Savas (2000) defines 
privatization broadly as relying more on private institutions of society and less on 
government to satisfy people’s needs, Plane (1997) defines it as the full transfer of 
government’s property rights to private shareholders. As noted earlier, Pirie (1986) 
identified more than 22 different definitions of privatization.
Associated with the definition is the problem of measurement validity with respect 
to the measure used for privatization in assessing its impact. For example, Barnett (2000), 
Bortolotti et al. (2003), Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003), and Cook and Uchida (2003) used 
privatization revenue or proceeds as a percentage of GDP as a measure of privatization to 
control for the effect of country size. However, Berthelemy et al. (2004) argue that the 
use of privatization proceeds share in GDP is not the most appropriate measure for 
assessing the fiscal impact of privatization. This is because the GDP figures overshadow 
the privatization statistics and also the resulting ratio does not take into account the size 
of the budget. Berthelemy et al. (2004) therefore suggest the use of the average annual 
sales during the active period of privatization as a percentage of government revenue 
(excluding grants). Further, while Barnett (2000) and Filipovic (2005) used OLS 
regression techniques, Plane (1997) used Probit and Logit estimation techniques, and 
Cook and Uchida (2003) employed the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA).
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From a different perspective, Yoder et al. (1991) claim that the best measure for 
privatization is the level of private sector participation in the economy (private sector 
spending) as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP). This is measured by the 
inverse of the level of public sector spending as a percentage of GNP (1 -  public sector 
spending as a percentage of GNP). Yoder et al.’s (1991) measure of privatization has 
inherent problems as it equates the private sector activity to privatization, which in reality 
is not the case since the private sector measures the overall private sector activity in the 
economy as opposed to the activity of the newly privatized firms. Though many 
arguments have been made in favor of the various measures used, most of the current 
literature on privatization used the privatization proceeds share in GDP and will be used 
to assess the impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality.
The other limitation in the study of privatization is the lack of consensus on what 
is to be measured. Most of the studies reviewed equate economic development to 
economic growth, which is represented by the GDP per capita income. The economic 
growth measure (income per capita) is a purely income based measure which does not 
take into account the extent to which the basic needs of the population are met (Meier and 
Rauch, 2000). The emphasis on economic growth therefore results in a tendency to 
overstate the positive outcomes of most policy changes, including privatization. This, in 
turn, may lead to a disconnect between changes in individual wealth and the state’s fiscal 
health (Reese and Fasenfest, 1997). As noted by Beauregard (1994, p. 271), economic 
development must go beyond mere increases in income to the “ .. .enhancement of the 
capacity of local citizens to act and innovate.” Malizia and Feser (2000) also made this
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point in their claim that wealth and job creation must not benefit only corporate 
shareholders, but also local workers and community residents.
From a more comprehensive perspective, Lewis (1984) defines economic 
development as the study of economic structure and behavior of the poor, while Sen 
(1988), Chenery and Srinivasan (1988), Hirschman (1958), Kindleberger (1965), and 
Stiglitz (1998) describe economic development as the transformation of society. Sen 
(1988) explains economic development as the enhancement of individuals’ lives, 
standard of living, common safety and each person’s happiness. Chenery and Srinivasan 
(1988) explain the transformation to mean the reduction of poverty, improvements in 
health and education of the population, an increase in productive capacity as well as an 
increase in per capita income.
Kindleberger (1965) asserts that while growth means more output and more 
efficiency, economic development goes beyond these to imply changes in the structure of 
inputs and in the allocation of the inputs. Stiglitz (1998) sums up the whole idea of 
development as a transformation of society that it involves a movement from traditional 
ways of thinking and dealing with health and education to more modem ways. He further 
states:
The changes that are associated with development provide 
individuals and societies with more control over their own 
destiny. Development enriches the lives of individuals by 
widening their horizons and reducing their sense of 
isolation. It reduces the afflictions brought on by disease 
and poverty, not only increasing life spans, but improving 
the quality of life (p.5).
Obviously, if privatization is to be seen as a policy to improve not only the 
efficiency of firms but also the living conditions of the citizenry, then the preferred
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measure to assess its impact must be one that takes into consideration both economic and 
social factors. Undoubtedly, if government policies are intended to identify program 
improvements, then a broader examination of the policy impacts, distributional 
implications, and differential social and economic effects must be undertaken (Loftman, 
1995). Murphy et al. (1989) claim that most episodes of economic growth are due to high 
incomes generated by any leading sector being broadly distributed that it materializes as 
demand for a broad range of domestic manufacturers. As noted by Vernon (1988), 
privatization may be seen as a philosophical or economic issue in developed countries, 
but for most developing and transitional economies, privatization has development 
imperatives.
Privatization is therefore not only an economic tool, but also has social and 
political implications. Consequently, economic development, which is a measure of the 
income growth and how one’s basic needs are met, is a more appropriate measure for 
assessing the impact of privatization. This is because a government’s responsibility is not 
only to be efficient in the delivery of service, but also to be equitable. As argued by Seers 
(1969), economic development must not only create jobs but also reduce both absolute 
poverty and income inequality. From a policy perspective, Hunt (1997, p. 86) states that 
“ ... .income distribution is the simplest and most effective device for gaining a general 
sense of a society’s prospects” and thus tells more about the state of an economy than any 
other single indicator. Hence, politicians in making policy decisions are generally 
concerned about both income growth and distribution implications.
Similarly, Buress (1996) argues that government policy makers have multiple 
goals other than output growth and claims that the exclusive use of GNP is based on a
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“one dollar one vote” philosophy, which he said is inconsistent with the “one person one 
vote” principle of democracy. According to the former Managing Director (Michael 
Camdessus) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the primary policy objective in 
the developing countries must be growth. He states that “When I refer to growth, I mean, 
high quality growth, not just growth for the privileged few, leaving the poor with nothing 
but empty promises” (Camdessus, 1998, p.235).
In recent times both the World Bank and IMF have all realized the importance of 
considering the effects of policy on income growth, poverty, and income distribution. 
This is demonstrated by the World Bank’s shift from Structural Adjustment Programs to 
Poverty Reduction Strategies, while the IMF has replaced its Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facilities (ESAFs) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities 
(Bayliss, 2000b). The increasing importance of income inequality can be seen in the 
current World Development Report (2006) main theme: Equity and Development. The 
World Development Report (2006) emphasizes the important role of equity in economic 
development and especially in poverty reduction. The report notes:
We argue that an equity lens enhances the poverty reduction 
agenda. The poor generally have less voice, less income, and less 
access to services than other people. When societies become more 
equitable in ways that lead to greater opportunities for all, the poor 
stand to benefit from a “dual dividend.” First expanded 
opportunities benefit the poor directly through greater participation 
in the development process. Second, the development process itself 
may become more successful and resilient as greater equity leads 
to better institutions, more effective conflict management, and a 
better use of resources in society, including those of the poor. 
Resulting increases in economic growth rates in poor countries 
will, in turn contribute to a reduction in global inequities (p.9).
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The report further demonstrates that despite there being a short-run trade-off 
between equity and deficiency, equity is necessary for economic growth and long-term 
development. This long term complementarily stems from the fact that with imperfect 
markets, inequalities in power and wealth translate into unequal opportunities, which 
leads to wasted productive potential and an inefficient allocation of resources. Even 
more important is the report’s observation that income inequality which leads to unequal 
power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status, 
and health- and that typically are also bad for investment, innovation, and risk taking that 
underpins long-term growth.
Because of the emphasis being placed on income distribution by the World Bank, 
IMF, and other donor organizations, the evaluation of the impact of policy reforms on the 
ordinary citizen has gained currency in the privatization literature (Birdsall and Nellis, 
2002; Gupta et al., 1999; Mackenzie and Mookherjee, 2002; Zinnes et al., 2001). These 
studies indicate that the criteria used for evaluating privatization focuses on profitability, 
labor productivity, and firm growth, which do not give any information on the impact of 
privatization on the citizens. Mackenzie and Mookherjee (2002) assert that market 
evaluation that focuses on increase in profitability may come at the expense of customers, 
workers and other social groups as a result of increased prices, lower levels of 
employment, longer work hours and the neglect of environmental effects. Birdsall and 
Nellis (2002) in a review of privatization literature that had focused on some measures of 
welfare (employment and prices) report that privatization in general had worsened the 
distribution of assets and income at least in the short term. The study, however, was
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limited to Latin-American countries and therefore the findings cannot be freely 
generalized.
Gupta et al. (1999) reviewed various methods of privatization in transition 
economies as well as other selected countries. The authors found that privatization 
promotes economic efficiency and growth, thereby reinforcing macroeconomic 
adjustment. However, privatization also led to job losses, higher prices for consumers and 
dramatic widening of the income distribution, especially in transition economies. The 
basic premise of these authors is that politics trumps economics and hence redistributive 
issues are of major concern in policy making.
What these studies reveal as noted by Cling et al. (2006) is the fact that equity is 
an intrinsic part of development, where development is seen as extending beyond the 
merely economic (level of GDP per capita) to encompass respect for human rights, of 
which equal opportunities and the absence of absolute poverty are an integral part. None 
of the country-level studies have so far concentrated on studying both the broader 
economic and social impacts of privatization in developing countries during the active 
years of privatization. This is the specific gap that this dissertation proposes to fill.
The central theme of this study is that the impacts of policy reforms and for that 
matter privatization, has both economic and social consequences and hence these 
outcomes (economic growth and income inequality) need to be evaluated. In extending 
the literature to the distributional impact, the authors are quick to point out that it does 
not wholly resolve the issue of the determinants of economic development. However, in 
doing so, it adds to our understanding of the development process and how it is affected 
by policies such as privatization. Accordingly, this dissertation does not question the
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relevance of the output growth measure, but argues that taking only an aggregated view 
of incomes does not tell the whole story of economic development.
Further, the focus on income distribution is especially important given the nature 
of the current backlash in many countries against further privatization. The backlash is 
nurtured by the widespread view that the effects of privatization have been to enrich the 
already rich and powerful, and sometimes corrupt at the expense of the poor (Nellis and 
Birdsall, 2005). Obviously, identifying the validity of the effects of privatization on the 
ordinary citizen is important because high levels of income inequality may not only slow 
growth but also promote political instability (Baliamoume-Lutz, 2004). In accordance 
with the discussion above, this study examines the impact of privatization on both 
economic growth and income inequality in developing countries. The methodology and 
data used in the analyses are discussed in the next section.




The unit of analysis for the study is at the country level. The study employs a cross -  
sectional design in an effort to examine the impact of privatization on economic growth 
and income inequality. The sample consists of developing countries that the World Bank 
Privatization Database provides data on their privatization program between 1991 and 
2002. The study employs ordinary least regression analysis with interaction regressors to 
examine the impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality in 
developing countries. The data are annual observations for a sample of 80 developing 
countries. There is no consistent time series data on the privatization variable for the 
sample of countries studied and therefore we follow the usual practice in previous 
research using cross-country regressions with respect to economic growth and 
privatization. The averages of the variables over the period of the study are used to help 
reduce the noise in the annual data (Cook and Uchida, 2003; Filipovic, 2005; Gyimah- 
Brempong and Camacho, 2006; Plane, 1997). The models for the empirical analyses for 
the study are discussed below.
Model Specification
The main goal of this study is to examine the impact of privatization on economic growth 
and income inequality. The empirical analysis for the study is based on prior privatization 
and economic growth literature (Barnett, 2000; Cook and Uchida, 2003; Plane, 1997;
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Filipovic, 2005). The basic regression analysis for the cross section of 80 countries is 
specified below. The study adopts the basic growth equation as has been used in earlier 
privatization studies and postulates that:
Y = ao + aiB + a2Z + a3M + u (1)
where Y is the average Real GDP per capita growth rate; djS are the coefficients to be 
estimated. B is a set of variables including; the stock of human capital (SEC), degree of 
openness of the economy (OPEN), initial level of development (LGCAP), population 
growth rate (POP), rate of inflation (INF), and foreign direct investment (FDI). M is the 
economic policy being studied, which in this case is the privatization variable (PR). Z is a 
set of additional variables that are included to capture the country conditions, which 
literature suggests have an impact on economic growth. The country conditions are 
proxied by the institutional or governance infrastructure and geographical conditions 
(whether or not a country is landlocked) and u is the stochastic error term.
To examine whether the impact of privatization in developing countries is 
sensitive to the type of countries included in the sample or regional differences, we 
control for the regional blocs. The regression model for controlling for the regional 
groups is specified as follows:
Y = a 0 + a i B + a 2 Z  +  a 3 P R  + a 4Di+u (2)
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D is a dummy for regional groups: Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin America (LA), Asia 
(AS), and Middle Eastern and North African Countries (MENA), where:
LA = [ 1 if Latin American country; 0 otherwise]
SSA = [ 1 if Sub-Saharan African country; 0 otherwise]
AS = [1 if  Asian country; 0 otherwise]
To prevent perfect collinearity (where one of the regressors is an exact linear function of 
the other regressors) problems, only three of the categories or regional groupings are 
entered in the regression equation at a time. Thus, for J number of categories, the number 
of categories to be entered in the regression equation is J-l. The group left out is called 
the reference group (Stock and Watson, 2003). The reference or comparison group is the 
group of countries in the sample that are members of MENA. The coefficient for a 
dummy variable measures the difference in values between the region in question and the 
reference group.
Further, to capture possible regional differences in the growth effect of 
privatization, we include the cross product of the privatization and the regional dummies 
(PR  Dj) in the regression, which is specified as follows:
Y = a  o + aiB + a 2Z + a3PR+ a  4 Dj + a5PR Dj + u (3)
The impact of privatization on the reference group will be indicated by the coefficient for 
PR, whereas the coefficient for the interaction term PRD; captures the difference in the 
impact of privatization between the region in question and the reference group.
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Finally, the privatization literature suggests that privatization’s effect on the 
economy is dependent on country conditions in terms of institutional infrastructure, 
degree of openness, and the flow of foreign direct investment; consequently the validity 
of this claim is examined in the following model:
Y = a 0 + a i B  +  a 2 Z  +  a 3 P R  + a 4 l + u  (4)
where I is a set of zero, one, or more interaction terms. The interaction terms used in the 
study are PR*FDI; PR*OPEN; AND PR*GOV, which represent privatization and foreign 
direct investment, privatization and openness, and privatization and governance 
infrastructure respectively. The inclusion of the interaction term is based on the 
assumption that the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable depends 
on the value of another independent variable. This means the partial effect of one variable 
depends on the value of another. The interaction terms are obtained by multiplying 
privatization variable with each of the three variables (Stock and Watson, 2003).
The income inequality regressions follow the same models in the growth 
regressions, where we estimated four basic regression equations. Income inequality 
measures are used in separate regressions as dependent variables as follows:
INEQ = a 0+ «iB + a2 Z + a3 M + u (5)
INEQ = a 0 + aiB + a2Z + a 3 PR + a4Di + u (6)
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INEQ = a 0+ aiB + a 2Z + a 3 PR + a 4Di + a 5PRDi + u 
INEQ = a 0 + aiB + a 2 Z + a 3 PR + a 4l  + u
(7)
(8)
where INEQ refers to the income inequality measures (INEQ 10% and INEQ 20%), 
which will be used as dependent variables in separate regressions. The other notations (a, 
B, PR, Z, I, PR*Di, and u) have similar explanations as those in the growth 
regressions. However, we include an additional variable; the square of the level of 
development measure as one of the B variables to capture the fact that the relationship 
between income inequality and level of development is curvilinear rather than linear.
This argument follows the traditional Kuznets’ (1955) hypothesis which indicates that 
income inequality initially increases with development, but in the long run it decreases.
Data
The study analyzed the impact of privatization on economic growth and income 
inequality in 80 developing countries using data from 1991-2002. Though the World 
Bank Privatization Database (2005) provides privatization transactions and proceeds 
between 1988 and 2003, this study focuses on the period between 1991 and 2002, as this 
is the period in which most privatization activity occurred in developing countries. Table 
1A and 2A in the Appendix gives the privatization, economic growth rates, and income 
inequality data respectively. The data are annual observations for a sample of 80 
developing countries: 33 from SSA; 22 from Latin America; 12 from Asia; and 13 from 
North Africa and the Middle East. Because of data limitations, not all countries had 
consistent data over the period of the study. The data set has complete observations for
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75 countries for the growth regressions and 60 countries for income inequality 
regressions.
The variables, symbols, and sources of data collection are summarized in Table 
3 A in the Appendix). The list of landlocked countries is given in Table 4A and the 
complete data used in the analyses are given in Tables 5 A and 6A of the Appendix. The 
variables used in the study are described next.
Dependent Variables
Economic growth and income inequality are the dependent variables for this research and 
are used in separate regressions. Economic growth is proxied by the per capita rate of 
growth of real GDP during the study period (1991-2002). The use of real GDP per capita 
is important because it is inflation adjusted and consequently reflects the real value of 
goods and services compared to using the GDP per capita. With respect to income 
inequality, two main measures have been used: the Gini index and the share of income 
groups of individuals from their population share.
Though, both measures have limitations (Muller, 1984), the Gini provides a 
summary measure over the entire range of the populations and may therefore be 
insensitive to the degree of inequality in particular ranges (Ahluwalia, 1974). Allison 
(1978) argues that the Gini tends to be most sensitive to transfers around the middle of 
the distribution and the least sensitive to transfers among the very rich or the very poor. 
Consequently, we use the ratio of the income share of the richest 20% and the poorest 
20% of population (INEQ20%) and the ratio of the share of income going to the richest 
and poorest 10% of the population (INEQ 10%). These measures of inequality explain
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how the lower and upper end income populations benefit from privatization. A positive 
coefficient on these measures indicates increasing inequality and a negative coefficient 
explains otherwise
Independent Variables
The choice of explanatory variables was informed by prior literature (Barnett, 2000;
Cook and Uchida, 2003; Filipovic, 2005; Plane, 1997). Privatization revenues as a 
percentage of GDP; log of the initial real GDP per capita (LGDCAP), square of LGCAP 
(LGCAPSQ), log of the inflation rate, population growth rate, trade share in GDP; 
secondary school enrollment, geographical location, governance infrastructure or 
institutional quality and FDI share in GDP. The initial level of development and the rate 
of inflation variables were transformed (log transformation) because the raw data were 
highly skewed.
The main independent variable of interest is privatization, which is proxied by the 
total privatization revenues (1991-2002) as a percentage of average GDP (1991-2002). 
The use of the aggregate privatization revenue over the study period is based on the 
assumption that the effect of privatization is not instantaneous and that the benefits of 
privatization for a given year will depend on the overall level of privatization that has 
taken place (Filipovic, 2005). The period between 1991 and 2002 was chosen because 
most reports on privatization in the developing countries show that privatization picked 
up at the end of the 1980s and peaked at the end of the 1990s (World Bank Privatization 
Database, 2005). Consequently, focusing on this time period will help to provide more 
information as to the impacts of privatization in developing countries. From the
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efficiency gains associated with privatization as explained by the property rights, public 
choice, and agency theories, a positive effect of privatization is expected on both 
economic growth and income distribution.
The LGCAP controls for the initial level of development at the beginning of 
privatization. Some other studies have used GDP per capita as the measure of level of 
development; however, this has a comparability problem in cross-country regressions. 
Since it involves the use of official exchange rate in converting GDP measured in 
domestic currency to GDP measured in dollars, and consequently it does not reflect the 
real purchasing power of different countries (Tsai, 1995). The use of real GDP per capita, 
which is inflation adjusted, therefore helps to overcome this problem. Further, a log 
transformation is employed because of the wide variations in GDP per capita of the 
various developing countries. For example, the lowest GDP per capita for the group of 
countries studied is Tanzania with a real GDP per capita of $494.12 and Saudi Arabia 
with the highest GDP per capita of $16,368.92. The descriptive statistics show a standard 
deviation of $3074.23, which is nearly ten times the value of the GDP per capita of 
Tanzania.
LGCAPSQ is an additional variable that is included in the income inequality 
regressions as the level of development and income inequality is hypothesized to exhibit 
a curvilinear relationship (Ahluwalia, 1976; Kuznets, 1955; Sylwester, 2005; Tsai, 1995). 
Income inequality is therefore expected to increase initially but over time, continual 
growth will lead to a reduction in income inequality. We therefore expect LGCAP to be 
positive and LGCAPSQ to be negatively correlated with income inequality. Human 
capital is proxied by the secondary school enrollment, which captures the degree of
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human capital improvement beyond the basic level of education (Ahluwalia, 1976). It is 
expected the human capital variable will have positive effects on both economic growth 
and income distribution (Makki and Somarwu, 2004).
The trade (exports plus imports) share as a percentage of GDP is a proxy for the 
degree of openness of a country’s economy. The globalization literature suggests that 
openness promotes growth, however, openness also increases income disparities between 
countries. Consequently we expect the openness to exert a positive effect on economic 
growth and a negative effect on the distribution of income. Population growth rate 
controls for the fact that the benefits of an economic policy may be diluted by high 
population growth rates (Bomschier et al., 1978). The ratio of FDI to GDP is included on 
the assumption that FDI may play a significant role in generating positive spillover 
effects in terms of new technologies and management skills that contribute to growth 
(Sylwester, 2005). Many studies, however, indicate that FDI is negatively correlated with 
the distribution of income (Dixon and Boswell, 1996a, 1996b; Beer, 1999).
Consequently, we expect a positive effect of FDI on growth and a negative effect on the 
distribution of income respectively.
The inflation rate over the study period is included to capture the consistency of 
monetary and fiscal policies, as large structural fiscal imbalances may lead to debt 
monetization and higher inflation rates. Major international institutions focus on 
controlling inflation as a mechanism for boosting long economic Growth. Romer and 
Romer (1998) claim that inflation may hurt the poor more than the rich, because the rich 
have other financial instruments that they use to hedge themselves against the negative
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effects of inflation. Consequently, we expect inflation to be negatively correlated with 
economic growth and positively correlated with income inequality.
Geography has gained a lot of prominence in recent growth literature (Acemoglu 
et al., 2003; Crafts and Venables, 2001; Henderson et al., 2000; Redding and Venables, 
2004; Sachs, 2003). These authors argue that the direct effects of geographical location 
explain a large portion of the variance in the income per capita across countries. Redding 
and Venables (2004), for example, claim that remoteness of markets and sources of 
supply explain why many developing countries have not benefited from the globalization 
process. The geographical variables that have been used in cross-country growth 
regressions include climate zone, disease ecology, and whether or not a country is 
landlocked. In this study, a landlocked measure is employed, which is a dummy variable 
showing whether or not a country has a coastline or has access to the sea or ocean. 
Obviously, lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from world 
markets will lead to high transit costs and impose constraints on the overall socio­
economic development of the landlocked country. Being landlocked is therefore expected 
to have a negative effect on economic growth and a positive effect on income inequality. 
The list of landlocked countries is given in Table 4 A of the appendix.
An additional variable that measures the level of institutional quality or 
governance infrastructure is included in the regression analysis as most authors argue that 
good institutions promote growth (Olson et al., 2000; Rodrik et al., 2004). The concept of 
governance is not concise and many authors define the term in various ways. In this study 
we employ the governance definition by the World Bank (1992). Governance is defined 
as the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s
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economic and social resources and the capacity of government to design, formulate, and 
implement policies. Good governance is therefore expected to promote economic growth 
and reduce income inequality.
Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) six governance indicators were used as proxies for 
governance or institutional quality for two main reasons. First, the indicators are 
aggregates of many indices and therefore measurement error may be less as compared to 
individual indicators. Second, there are data points for many countries compared to the 
governance ratings by other agencies like the International Country Risk Guide or 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence. It is important to note that we used the newest 
version of Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) governance indicators as they replace the older 
versions (1999; 2003).
The scores of the six governance indicators lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher 
scores corresponding to better governance. The six Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) governance 
indicators are defined below:
• Voice and Accountability (VOICE) measures the extent to which citizens of a 
country are able to participate in the election of their governments.
• Political stability (POLST) measures the absence of violence and the likelihood 
that a government in power will not be overthrown by unconstitutional means and 
or by violence.
• Government effectiveness (GOVEFF) is a measure of the quality of the public 
service-quality of the bureaucracy, competency of civil servants, independence of 
civil service from political and governments commitment to its policies.
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• Regulatory quality (REG) focuses on the extent of market friendly policies like 
price control or banking supervision, and also perceptions of the burdens imposed 
by excessive regulation.
• Rule of Law (RULE) indicator measures the extent to which citizens have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society.
• Control of corruption (CORR) measures perceptions of corruption, defined as the 
exercise of public or state power for private gain.
Data Analysis
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main economic variables of interest. The 
summary statistics indicate that the growth rates for the various countries varied between 
-3.22 for (Zimbabwe) and 9.78 (Qatar) between 1991 and 2002. The highest and lowest 
privatizers in terms of the privatization proceeds as a percentage of GDP for the period 
are both in Sub-Saharan Africa (Zambia and Sao Tome and Principe). The average 
privatization proceeds as a percentage of GDP for the four regions are as follows: Sub- 
Saharan (3.64); Latin America (5.29); Asia (2.18); and Middle Eastern and North African 
countries (2.96). The inflation rate and initial GDP per capita show wide variations, 
which therefore required their being transformed (log transformation) to reduce any bias 
that the large differences might create. There is also wide variation in the corruption 
index, which ranged from -2.12 for Angola to 2.65 for Chile. The sample therefore is 
made up of countries that are perceived to have good institutional infrastructure as well as 
those with poor institutional infrastructure. The values quoted for the governance index
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are the principal component values, which explain why Chile’s value is higher than the 
2.5 maximum as reported by Kaufmann et al. (2005).
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Number of 
observations
Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
Rate of inflation 80 .17 891 38.85 131.22
Log INF 80 -.77 2.95 1.03 .57
Growth 80 -3.22 9.78 3.31 2.33
Privatization 
revenues in GDP
80 . 0 0 24.26 3.84 4.98
Income Inequality 
(1 0 %)
60 6.60 105.00 27.15 21.97
Income Inequality 
(2 0 %)
60 4.30 57.60 13.15 9.45
Population 80 .44 7.35 1.95 .89
Foreign Direct 
Investment
77 -1.60 14.94 2.73 2.84
Trade share in 
GDP
80 21.83 204.54 71.74 35.29
Log GDP per 
capita
77 2.69 4.21 3.38 .36
Square of LGCAP 77 7.26 17.76 11.57 2.48
Secondary school 
enrollment
80 5.55 97.82 46.97 25.87
Governance 71 -2 . 1 2 2.65 -.049 .933
The initial correlation matrix for the governance indicators shows that they are 
highly correlated with each other at the 1% level, with a coefficient between 0.403 and
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0.898 (Table 3). This means that all of the six indicators cannot be used in the same 
regression, because of multicollinearity problems. Consequently, following Globerman 
and Shapiro (2003), a summary measure that is utilized was from their first principal 
component, denoted as GOV. The individual indicators are also used in separate 
regressions to check for the robustness of the relationship between governance and 
economic growth and income inequality.
Table 3: Correlation Matrix for Governance Indicators
VOICE POLST GOVEFF REG
VOICE 1 .0 0
POLST .530 1 .0 0
GOVEFF .403 .698 1 .0 0
REG .604 .569 .752 1 .0 0
LAW .425 .674 .898 .737




Table 4 displays the correlation matrix for the variables. The correlation matrix shows 
that privatization is negatively correlated with economic growth, while it is positively 
correlated with both measures of income inequality. In both cases, however, the 
coefficients do not reach the level of significance. The governance variable is negatively 
correlated with economic growth and positively correlated with income inequality. Like 
the privatization variable, none of the governance coefficients were significant. This
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might be an example of a situation where a strong relationship between the two variables 
can only be revealed after controlling for other variables in the regression equation 
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). Population growth rate is positive and significantly 
correlated with economic growth, but negative and insignificantly correlated with both 
income inequality measures. On other hand, FDI is positive and significantly correlated 
with both income inequality measures but positive and insignificantly correlated with 
economic growth. The landlocked variable is negatively correlated with economic growth 
and positively correlated with income inequality, but the coefficients are not significant.
In the next chapter, the results of the ordinary least regression estimation of the 
models specified above are presented and discussed.

























































































































































































































Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
This section presents and discusses the results of the study, the implications of the 
findings, directions for future research, and offers concluding remarks.
Privatization and Economic Growth Regressions
The study employed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with interaction regressors to 
examine the impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality. The 
privatization and growth regression results are reported in Table 5. Privatization is 
negative but insignificantly correlated with economic growth (Columnl). This finding is 
different from most of the studies reviewed in this study. While Plane (1997) and Barnett 
(2 0 0 0 ) find a significant positive correlation between privatization and economic growth, 
Cook and Uchida (2003) report a significant negative effect of privatization on economic 
growth.
Consequently, to examine whether the negative insignificant effect of 
privatization on economic growth is due to a specification error or the omission of 
region-specific factors, the regional groupings are controlled for and the results are 
reported in Column 2. The coefficient of the privatization variable remains unchanged 
indicating that the negative effect is not due to a possible mis-specification associated
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1 2 .0 2 2 ***
(4.412)
F-test 3.357 3.140 2.630
N 75 75 75
Rz .317 .33 .324
Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% evel; ***Significant at the l%level
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with regional differences. Column 2 shows that all the regional dummies have a negative 
correlation with growth; however, the coefficient on the Latin American dummy is 
significant at the 5% level.
The interaction of privatization with the regional dummies shows that 
privatization is positively correlated with economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America but negatively correlated with growth in Asia (Column 3). However, in all 
cases the effect is not significant. Further, the privatization variable (PR) which captures 
privatization’s effect on the reference group (MENA countries) is negative but 
insignificant. Two main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, there is no 
difference in the effect of privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East and North African countries on one hand, and Asia and Middle East and 
North African countries on the other. Second, privatization did not have a significant 
impact on economic growth in the developing countries studied between 1991 and 2002.
The initial real GDP per capita is negative and significantly correlated with 
growth in all the model specifications (Columns 1 through 3), which supports the 
hypothesis that countries at a lower of level of development grow faster and over time 
catch up with countries at a higher level of development (Barro, 1991; Datta and 
Agarwal, 2004). The human capital variable (SEC) is positively correlated with economic 
growth (Column 1), but on the inclusion of the regional dummies, the SEC coefficient 
becomes negative. The inflation variable (LGINF) is negative but insignificantly 
correlated with economic growth, with and without the regional controls. Population 
growth rate is positive and significantly correlated with growth (with and without the 
regional dummies at the 5% level. This finding suggests that the population growth rate
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contributed to growth of the developing countries between 1991 and 2002. Foreign direct 
investment is positive and significantly correlated with growth (Column 1) at the 5% 
level and at the 1% level when the regional blocs are controlled for (Column 2).
Openness is negative but insignificantly correlated with growth in both 
regressions with and without the regional groupings. Thus, openness did not have a 
significant effect on growth over the study period. The landlocked variable is negative 
and significantly correlated with economic growth at the 1% level (Column 1). This 
means that being landlocked is associated with a penalty of -1.92, or 2% lower growth 
rates than those countries that are not landlocked. When the regional blocs are controlled 
for, the coefficient on the landlocked variable is still significant at the 1% level (Columns 
2 and 3), which means that the negative growth effect of being landlocked is not sensitive 
to regional location. Further, the study’s results indicate that after controlling for 
institutions, being landlocked still has a significant negative effect on economic growth. 
This result contradicts Rodrik et al.’s (2004) and Easterly and Levine’s (2002) assertion 
that after controlling for institutions, geography does not have an effect on growth. 
However, Bosker and Garretsen (2006), Redding and Venables (2004) and Sachs (2003) 
report results that are similar to this study’s findings.
The governance variable is positive and significantly correlated with growth at the 
10% level (Column 1), but when the regional blocs are controlled for, the significance 
improves to the 5% level (Columns 2 and 3). To check for the robustness of the 
relationship between governance and economic growth, we use the individual indicators 
rather than the composite measure of governance and the results are reported in Table 6 . 
The results show that three indicators; government effectiveness (Column 6 ), rule of law
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Table 6: Growth Regression with Individual Governance Indicators

























































































































F-Test 2.781 3.100 3.767 2.826 3.756 3.771
N 75 75 75 75 75 75
R2 .278 .300 .343 .281 .342 .343
Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at t le l%level
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(Column 8 ), and corruption (Column 9) are all significant at the 5% level.
The cross product results are reported in Table 7. The inclusion of PR*FDI,
PR* OPEN, and PR* GOV, which represent the interaction of privatization with foreign 
direct investment, openness, and governance respectively do not lead to appreciable 
changes in the results. A few of the results, however, are worth examining further. First, 
the same variables (level of development, population growth, foreign direct investment, 
landlocked and governance variables) are significant in most of the regressions. Second, 
the inclusion of the interaction variables did not affect the model fit, ranging from .325 to 
0.351. Third, PR*GOV and PR*FDI are positively correlated with economic growth, 
while PR* OPEN is negatively correlated with economic growth. In all cases, however, 
the coefficients are not statistically significant. When the interaction regressors were 
entered two at a time, though the cross product variables were not significantly correlated 
with growth, the PR variable changed from negative and insignificant to positive and 
insignificant.
It is important to note that we did not include the PR* FDI and PR* OPEN in the 
same regression equation because the two variables are highly correlated, with a 
coefficient of 0.759. Also the correlation matrix shows a correlation between PR and 
PR*OPEN (coefficient of .779) and PR*FDI (coefficient of 0.824) and therefore in 
Column 16, the cross products are entered without the privatization variable. The results 
show that both interaction regressors are not significantly correlated with economic 
growth.
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Table 7: Privatization Interaction Growth Regressions
10 11 13 14 15 16
PR -.065 .103 -.065 .077 -.087
( .121) (.098) ( .121) ( .102) (-123)
LGCAP -3.030*** -3.306*** -3.030*** -3.408*** -3.162 -3.307***
(1.131) (1.103) (1.131) ( 1.110) (1.136) (1.113)
LGINF -.569 -.748 -.569 -.736 -.557 -.722
(.547) (.503) (.547) (.504) (.547) (.493)
POP 1.090** .854* 1.090** .852 1.068** 1.038
(.470) (.496) (.470) (.486) (.470) (.466)
SEC -.001 .001 -.001 .001 -.001 -.001
(.014) (.014) (.140) (.014) (.015) (.014)
FDI .258** .354** .259** .347 .270** .257**
(.114) (.133) (•111) (.134) (.114) ( .112)
OPEN -.015 -.010 -.012 -.012 -.017 -.011
(.012 ) (.009) (.009) (.009) (-102) (.009)
GOV .689* .661* .571 .558 .564 .561
(.358) (.355) (.374) (.373) (.376) (.375)
LANLOC -1.964*** 1.692** -1 9 1 4 *** -1.703** -1 9 5 3 *** -1 913***











PR* GOV .099 .093 .100 .090
(.092) (.085) (.093) (.091)
Constant 12.789*** 13.732*** 13 7 9 7 *** 14.260*** 13.464*** 13.774***
(3.837) (3.774) (3.814) (3.823) (3.882) (3.843)
F-Test 3.015 3.225 3.144 3.002 2.855 3.114
N 75 75 75 75 75 75
R2 .320 .335 .329 .229 .216 .222
‘Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the l%level
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Privatization and Income Inequality Regressions
Table 8  reports the results of the privatization and income inequality regressions. Before 
analyzing the results, it is important to note that the hypothesis of a curvilinear 
relationship between income inequality and the level of development was first tested.
This is necessary because it allows for the identification as to whether or not to include 
the power term of LGCAP (LGCAPSQ), which is the initial level of development 
squared variable. This test therefore helps to reduce any bias or error that might be due to 
misspecification of the functional form of the model. The results show the initial level of 
development (LGCAP) and LGCAPSQ are negative and positively correlated with 
income inequality respectively, but insignificant in both cases (Columns 17 and 21). This 
suggests that there is no evidence for the Kuznets curve or a curvilinear relationship 
between the level of development and income inequality. As noted in Columns 17 and 
2 1 , when the two variables are included, both are insignificant, however, when the 
LGCAP alone is used it is significant at the 1% level (Columns 18 and 22).
Consequently, in the subsequent regressions, the power term (square of the initial level of 
development variable or LGCAPSQ) is not included in the regression analysis. Thus, we 
drop the power term without threatening the internal validity of our results (Stock and 
Watson, 2003).
Privatization is positive but insignificantly correlated with income inequality 
(Columns 18 and 22). Controlling for regional groupings does not change the coefficient 
on the privatization variable (Columns 19 and 23) and therefore the positive coefficient 
on privatization is not an artifact related to geographical differences in the sample of
83











Table 8: Privatization and Income Inequality Regressions
INEQ 10% INEQ 20%
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F-test 3.812 3.934 4.916 4.089 1.613 1.94 2.447 2.089
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 .323 .309 .443 .440 .094 .1 0 2 .227 .217
Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level
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countries studied. The coefficients of the Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
dummies are significant and positive at the 5% and 1% levels respectively for the INEQ 
10% measure. However, the Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American dummies are 
significant at the 5% and 10% level for the INEQ 20% measure, while the Asia dummy is 
positive but insignificant for both the INEQ 10% and INEQ 20% regressions (Columns 
19 and 23).
To examine whether privatization may have differential impacts in the various 
regions of the developing world, the cross product of the privatization variable and 
regional dummies were analyzed with respect to income inequality. The results show a 
negative effect of privatization on both measures of inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
a positive effect of privatization in Latin America and Asia (Columns 19 and 23). In all 
cases, however, the coefficients are not significant. The results indicate that there is no 
significant difference in privatization’s effect in the four regions studied, but even more 
importantly, privatization did not have a significant impact in any of the developing 
countries studied between 1991 and 2002.
FDI is significant and positively correlated with income inequality in all the 
model specifications, generally at the 5% level in the INEQ 20% regressions and at the 
1% level in the INEQ 10% regressions. This means that the richest in the population grew 
richer while the poorest grew poorer. This study’s result like those of Alderson and 
Nielsen (1999), Beer (1999), and Reuveny and Li (2003) support the dependency (or 
world systems) perspective that indicates that foreign capital penetration contributes 
negatively to the distribution of income in developing countries.
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Inflation is positively correlated with income inequality, but the coefficient 
becomes negative when the regional controls are included in the regression. In both 
cases, however, the coefficients are not significant. Openness is negative but 
insignificantly correlated with income inequality in all the model specifications with and 
without the regional controls. The landlocked variable is positive and significantly 
correlated with the INEQ 10% measure, but positive and insignificantly correlated with 
the INEQ 20% measure. Controlling for the regional blocs gives similar results.
The governance variable is negative and significantly correlated with inequality in 
all the model specifications; both the INEQ 10% and INEQ 20% measures and also with 
and without the regional controls (Columns 18 through 24). The effect of the individual 
governance indicators on income inequality are reported in Table 9. Only the INEQ 10% 
regressions are reported here. The results show that the same variables are significant as 
in the principal component regressions (Landlocked, Initial GDP per capita, and FDI).
All the governance indicators are negatively correlated with the income inequality 
measure but only the rule of law and government effectiveness variables are significant at 
the 5% level. The landlocked variable is significant at the 10% in four of six regressions 
(Columns 25 through 28), and significant at the 5% level in the Rule of Law regressions 
(Column 29), but insignificant in the corruption regression (Column 30). FDI was 
significant at the 1% level in all the model specifications, and the LGCAP was positive 
and significant at the 5% level in 2 regressions (Columns 25 and 26) and positive and 
significant at the 1% level in four regressions (Columns 27 through 30). The model fit or 
Readjusted also increased from a value of 0.266 for the voice and accountability 
regression to 0.346 for the government effectiveness regression.
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Table 9: Inequality Regression with individual Governance Indicators
INEQ 10% INEQ 20%
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N 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 .266 .289 .346 .278 .336 .303
F-test 3.406 3.662 4.467 3.523 4.318 3.853
‘Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the l%level
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The cross product results are qualitatively similar to the non-interaction regression 
results in terms of the variables that are significant (Table 10). However, a few 
differences emerge. First, the privatization and openness cross product (PR* OPEN) is 
positive and significantly correlated with income inequality (in both the INEQ 10% and 
INEQ 20%) at the 1% level (Columns 31, 34, 36, and 39). The inclusion of the 
privatization and Foreign direct investment (PR*FDI) and privatization and governance 
(PR* GOV) interaction variables do not result in any appreciable changes in results, 
however, the model fit reduced from a high of .422 to .287 in the INEQ 10% regressions 
and from .211 to .092 in the INEQ 20% regressions. The PR*OPEN and PR*FDI were 
not entered in the same regression equations, because the two variables are highly 
collinear, with a coefficient of .766.
Summary of Regression Results
The main findings of the study are as follows:
• Privatization is negative but insignificantly correlated with economic growth in 
developing countries.
• Privatization is negatively correlated with income inequality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia but positively correlated with income inequality in Latin 
America. However, in all cases, the coefficients were not significant. However, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America experienced greater levels of income 
inequality than Asia and the Middle Eastern and North African countries.
• FDI is positive and significantly correlated with both economic growth and 
income inequality.
• Landlocked is negative and significantly correlated with economic growth, but 
positive and significantly correlated with income inequality.
• Good governance is positive and significantly correlated with growth but negative 
and significantly correlated with income inequality.
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Table 10: Inequality Regressions with Interaction Regressors.
INEQ 10% INEQ 20%
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(12.460)
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F-test 5.312 3.512 3.493 4.833 3.158 2.576 1.645 1.595 2.474 1.543
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 .422 .299 .297 .417 .287 .2 1 1 .099 .092 .216 .092
Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level
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DISCUSSION
Privatization and Economic Growth
The study’s results indicate that privatization did not have a significant effect on 
economic growth with or without the regional group. Inclusion of the regional dummies, 
however, shows that only the Latin American dummy has a negative and significant 
coefficient. This means that Latin American countries experienced the slower rate of 
growth compared to Middle Eastern and North African countries between 1991 and 2002 
The result also indicates the growth rates of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia were not 
significantly different from the Middle Eastern and North African countries over the 
study period. This means that Latin America experienced the greatest distortions in its 
growth rates over the study period.
The study’s findings support the World Bank (2005) report “Economic Growth in 
the 1990s: Learning from a Decade o f Reform ” that indicates that growth in the 1990s was 
far below what was predicted. As noted in the Figure 10, the decline in the growth rate 
was steepest in Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa did not experience any 
appreciable growth. Though the growth rates across the developing countries were far 
from expected, the 1990s was not a disaster for economic development. From the 
standpoint of global poverty, the report claims that the most recent two decades proved to 
be the most favorable that the world has ever experienced. This was due to rapid and 
sustained growth in China, and a few other Asian countries including India, and Vietnam. 
The overall effect is the absolute reduction in the number of people living in extreme 
poverty, as China and India alone make up nearly one quarter of the World’s population.
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1975 1980 1990 2000
Source: World Bank (2005): Developing Countries GDP shown as a percentage of GDP 
per capita of the OECD GDP per capita (total regional GDP over total population).
The study’s findings therefore provide evidence to the World Bank (2005) report, which 
suggests that despite significant policy reform, improvements in the political and external 
environments, continued foreign aid, and a decade into the transition, many countries had 
still not caught up to their 1990 levels of output. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
successes were few—with Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique the most 
commonly cited instances. However, the report also notes that the economies of these 
countries still remained fragile after more than a decade of policy reforms. In Latin
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America, the report indicates that despite the dismantling of the state-led, populist, and 
protectionist policy regimes, GDP per capita was lower in the 1990s than it was between 
1950 and 1980. Interestingly, the report shows that in Vietnam, China, and India, where 
there were deviations from the full package of reforms (e.g., privatization and trade 
liberalization), growth was more substantial. China and India increased their reliance on 
market forces, but their policies remained highly unconventional. With high levels of 
trade protection, lack of privatization, extensive industrial policies, and lax fiscal and 
financial policies through the 1990s, these two economies hardly looked like exemplars 
of the Washington Consensus. Rodrik (2006) sums up his impressions of the 1990s as 
follows:
The one thing that is generally agreed on about the consequences 
of these reforms is that things have not worked out the way they 
were intended. Even their ardent supporters now concede that 
growth has been below expectations in Latin America (and the 
“transition crisis” deeper and more sustained than expected in 
former socialist economies. Not only were success stories in Sub- 
Saharan Africa few and far in between, but the market oriented 
reforms of the 1990s proved ill-suited to deal with the growing 
public health emergency in which the continent became embroiled
(p.2 ).
Similarly, a World Bank official, Kessides (2004), claims that privatization has been 
oversimplified, oversold, and more importantly, it has been disappointing. He further 
states:
For much of the 1990s privatization was heralded as elixir that 
would transform ailing lethargic state enterprises into sources of 
creative productivity and dynamism serving the public interests. 
National leaders burdened by large budget deficits and stagnating
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economies were outspoken on the need to foster private initiative 
as a means of promoting prosperity and enhancing the economic 
opportunities of al citizens. International financial institutions 
offered advice and promoted this movement in countries that 
received their aid. ... Recently, the alleged failures of privatization, 
improper restructuring, and overly rapid deregulation have led to 
street riots, skeptical press coverage, and mounting criticism of 
international financial institutions (pp. 52-53).
The statements above support the finding of the study that privatization did not have a 
significant impact on economic growth of developing countries between 1991 and 2002.
The human capital variable was not significant in any of the model specifications. 
This result contradicts many other studies that indicate human capital has a significant 
positive effect on economic growth (Borenzstein et al., 1998; Makki and Somarwu,
2004). It is important to note, however, that Sylwester (2005), in study of 29 developing 
countries finds a positive but insignificant effect of the human capital variable. On the 
other hand, Nyatepe-Coo (1998) in a study of selected developing countries reports a 
negative significant relationship between human capital and economic growth. The 
difference in results could be due to the proxy used for human capital as there is no 
consensus as to which is the best proxy for human capital. For example, Nyatepe- Coo 
(1998) used the percentage of working age population enrolled in secondary education, 
while Sylwester (2005) used the average number of years of schooling obtained by the 
adult population and this study employed the gross secondary school enrolment.
The inflation variable is negative but never significant in any of the model 
specifications. The study therefore does not find support for the finding that inflation has 
a deleterious effect on growth (Romer and Romer, 1998). Easterly and Levine (2002), 
however, report similar findings which indicate that macroeconomic policies (inflation
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and trade openness) do not explain economic development after controlling for 
institutions.
The significant positive correlation between FDI and economic growth in both 
regressions with and without the regional dummies provide support for the modernization 
perspective that suggests that FDI contributes positively to economic growth. The 
mechanisms through which this happens include: augmenting domestic investment, labor, 
marketing, and managerial skills; technological spillovers to local manufacturing firms; 
and increasing tax revenue for government (Baliamoume-Lutz, 2004; Le Vu and Suruga, 
2005; Sylwester, 2005; Zhang, 2001).
The negative correlation between the openness and economic growth contradicts 
other studies that report that integration into the world economy promotes growth (Dollar 
and Kraay, 2002; Sarel, 1997). Like Easterly and Levine (2002), however, Rodrik (2006) 
argues that the evidence that macroeconomic policies; price distortions, financial policies, 
and trade openness have predictable, robust, and systematic effects on national growth 
rates is quite weak. Rodrik (2006) notes that though fiscal deficits or autarkic trade 
policies can stifle economic growth; moderate amounts of each are associated with 
widely varying economic outcomes.
Similarly, Zagha et al. (2006) claim that the effect of trade reform is dependent 
on country conditions and how the process of liberalization is implemented. They note 
that some countries increased exports by reducing import tariffs, while others did so by 
creating export processing zones; or offering exporters incentives, including duty rebates; 
or making the exchange rate more competitive; or improving trade-related infrastructure, 
with export liberalization preceding import liberalization. Zagha et al. (2006) assert that
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in some cases, trade liberalization coincided with deteriorating export incentives (for 
example, exchange rate appreciation, as was the case in several South American 
countries), while in others export incentives were strengthened. Zagha et al. (2006) argue 
that trade reforms stimulate growth and help reduce poverty only when export incentives 
improve, but not when they deteriorate. Consequently, they suggest that trade is an 
opportunity, not a guarantee, and that it is overly naive to expect that simply opening 
one’s economy or reducing tariffs would automatically increase growth.
The landlocked variable is negatively correlated with economic growth both in 
regressions with and without the regional dummies, suggesting a negative growth effect 
on a country being landlocked. Bosker and Garretsen (2006), for example, show that of 
the geographic variables, being landlocked plays the most significant role in explaining 
world income differences. Also, the United Nations Report (2005) on landlocked 
countries indicates that the remoteness of countries from major world markets is the 
principal reason why landlocked developing countries have not been successful in 
mitigating their geographical handicap as compared to the developed landlocked 
countries in Europe. This is because major developed markets surround landlocked 
developed countries of Europe and their seaborne trade accounts for a relatively small 
part of their external trade. Their export is mainly high value added products and their 
distance from the seaport is relatively short. Further, the report notes that high transport 
costs facing landlocked countries is a far more restrictive barrier to trade for these 
countries than tariffs. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD] (2006) estimates based on the IMF balance of payments 
statistics show that on average landlocked developing countries spent almost two times
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more of their export earnings for the payment of transport and insurance services than the 
average of developed economies.
The positive and significant coefficient of the governance variable in all the 
model specifications is consistent with the studies of Kottaridi (2005), Ndulu and 
O’Connell (1999), and Rodrik et al. (2004) that indicate that good governance is 
important for economic growth. This is because good governance facilitates the 
development of market supporting institutions and the formalization of property rights, 
which help in the efficient allocation of resources (North, 1996; Soto, 1996). North 
(1996) argues that institutions are not only important in establishing efficient markets, but 
may indeed be the single most important determinant of economic performance. Soto 
(1996) describes institutions as the missing ingredient needed to spur growth in 
developing countries. Soto (1996) also claims that the difference between rich and poor 
countries is that rich countries have good institutions and poor countries generally have 
bad institutions.
The robustness check of the effect of governance on economic growth with 
individual governance indicators provides further evidence especially for the important 
role of government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption in promoting 
economic growth. This finding shows the importance of countries being able to limit the 
state’s power, enforce contracts, and protect investors to increase the growth rate of their 
economies (Shirley, 2003).
The cross product regressions show that none of the interaction variables are 
significantly correlated with economic growth. The study therefore does not find support 
for the argument that privatization’s effect on the economy is dependent on other factors
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like foreign direct investment, the degree of openness, and the governance environment. 
This result, however, does not necessarily mean that the institutional environment or the 
degree of openness is not important, but rather that they might not have reached the 
necessary threshold (to complement the privatization process) to have a significant 
impact on economic growth. As most of the literature on the determinants of privatization 
in developing countries indicate, privatization policy is much more likely to be crisis- 
driven and last ditch effort to turn the economy around, rather than a carefully chosen 
policy with explicit long-term goals to achieve economic development (Banerjee and 
Munger, 2004; Ramamurti, 2000). Accordingly, it is not surprising that most of these 
countries have not established the necessary institutional environment needed for 
privatization to succeed (Kikeri, 1992; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005).
Privatization and Income Inequality
The results show that even after controlling for regional blocks privatization did not have 
a significant effect on income inequality in the developing countries studied. However, 
the results also show positive and significant coefficient for the Sub -  Sahara African (at 
5% level) and Latin American dummies (at the 1% level), while the Asian dummy had a 
negative but insignificant coefficient. These results suggest that while Sub -  Sahara 
African and Latin American countries exhibited greater levels of inequality than the 
Middle Eastern and North African countries, there was no significant difference in 
income inequality between the Middle Eastern and Northern African and the Asian 
countries between 1991 and 2002. The implication is that Latin America and Sub- 
Saharan Africa experienced greater levels of inequality than Middle Eastern and Northern
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African and the Asian countries. This finding is not surprising, as Latin America is 
known to have the greatest level of income inequality in the world, with Sub-Saharan 
African countries following at a close second.
Table 11 shows the income inequality for the various regions over the past four 
decades, and it provides support for the findings of the study on income inequality. 
Morley (2001) explains Latin America’s high inequality to be due to three main factors:
Table 11: Median Gini Coefficients by Region and Decade
REGION 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Eastern Europe 25.1 24.6 25.0 28.9
South Asia 36.2 33.9 35.0 31.9
OECD and High 35.0 34.8 33.2 28.9
Income Countries
Middle East and 41.4 41.9 40.5 38.0
North Africa
East Asia and 37.4 39.9 38.7 38.1
Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.9 48.2 43.5 46.9
Latin America 53.2 49.1 49.7 49.3
Source: Deninger and Squire, 1996
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highly unequal distribution of education; decrease in the relative wage of unskilled labor 
from the 1980s through the 1990s; and the fact that the rich in Latin America are much 
richer relative to the remainder of the population than all the other regions of the world.
Further, the cross product of the privatization and the regional dummy variables 
results also show that privatization did not have a significant impact on income inequality 
in any of the regions. The big question then is if privatization does not have a significant 
effect on income inequality, why is there so much discontent and demonstrations in most 
countries against privatization, especially in Latin America and Africa (Kayizzi- 
Mugerwa, 2002; McKenzie and Mookerjee, 2002)? Quoting fiom Latinbarometer 
surveys, Kessides (2004) reports that disapproval ratings for privatization were higher in 
2002 than in 2000, and those in 2000 were higher than in 1998. In 2002, nearly 90% of 
the Argentines and 80% of Chileans polled disapproved of privatization.
There are many responses to the question raised above. Kessides (2004), for 
example, gives two main reasons for the inconsistency between what the theoretical and 
empirical literature suggest on one hand and the reality on the other. First, it is possible 
that due to data limitations and perhaps even methodological flaws, statistical models do 
not accurately measure the true welfare impact of these reforms. Second, it is also 
possible that public perceptions are subject to systematic bias. This disillusionment, 
Kessides (2004) argues, has been driven by employee layoffs, price increases, perceived 
long delays in benefits, and the negative distributional impacts of privatization.
On the other hand, Nellis (2006) argues that privatization’s benefits for consumers 
at large tend to be dispersed among amorphous, unorganized segments of the public, 
while the average benefits are small for each affected consumer. Mass benefits occur in
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the medium term, or at least they accrue to a significant size in the medium term. In other 
words, while the benefits of privatization are dispersed, in contrast, the costs are 
concentrated and affect a visible, vocal and urbanized few. These include; dismissed 
workers represented by powerful public sector unions, bureaucrats in supervisory 
ministries that lose their authority, and middle-and upper-income consumers about to lose 
a service long-furnished at a subsidized price. Nellis (2006, p. 18-19) asserts that though 
the sum of their welfare losses may be much less than the aggregate gain, these actors 
possess “voice” and access to power and they can and do make their needs and views 
known. Further, it is easier to mobilize protest against losses, and generate sympathy for 
the losers, than to engender gratitude for gains. Even more important as Nellis (2006) 
argues, is the fact that the affected workers and consumers take steps to protect their 
interests, portraying the loss as a threat to society and not simply to their group’s utility.
FDI is positively correlated with income inequality in all the model specifications. 
The study therefore does not find support for Tsai’s (1995) assertion that the positive 
effect of FDI on income inequality may be due to the most studies not controlling for 
regional groups. The negative impact of FDI on the distribution of income may be 
associated with convergence of the foreign investors’ and host country elite’s wealth 
creation ambition, which is a barrier to the trickle-down effect of industrialization 
predicted by the modernization theories (Beer, 1999). A typical case is when 
multinational corporations (MNCs) pressure governments to cut welfare expenditures and 
curb labor unions to reduce their wages, which invariably hurts the lower income classes 
(Nafziger, 1997). Further, Nafziger (1997) claims that MNCs exacerbate income 
inequalities by generating jobs, patronage and producing goods that primarily benefit the
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richest 20% of the population. On the other hand, foreign investment might create an 
industrial structure in which monopoly is predominant, leading to what Bornschier and 
Chase-Dunn (1985) describe as ‘underutilization of productive forces.’ The 
underutilization of productive forces results in stagnant economic growth, high 
unemployment levels, and a subsequent increase in income inequality.
The study’s finding of a positive but insignificant effect of inflation on income 
inequality contradicts most other studies that find inflation hurts the poor the most (Bulir, 
2001; Easterly and Fischer, 2001; Romer and Romer, 1998). Easterly and Fischer (2001), 
for example, argue that inflation may indeed hurt the poor more because the rich are more 
likely to have access to financial instruments that hedge in some way against inflation. A 
few other studies, however, support this study’s finding on inflation. For example, Sarel 
(1997) in a study of 45 developed and developing countries reports that inflation does not 
have an effect on income inequality. Similarly, Blank and Blinder (1986) argue that there 
is little or no evidence that inflation is the cruelest tax. Cardoso (1992) also asserts that 
inflation tax does not affect those already below the poverty line.
Openness is negative but never significant in any of the model specifications. The 
implication is that integration into the world economy does not have a significant impact 
on income disparities as reported by Behrman et al. (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2002). 
On the other hand, (Tsai, 1995) argues that openness to international competition could 
discipline domestic monopolistic or oligopolistic activities, leading to efficient allocation 
of resources and a subsequent decrease in income inequality. The study’s finding on 
openness, however, does not support any of these assertions. As noted by Zagha et al. 
(2006), the effect of trade reform is dependent on country conditions and the way the
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process of liberalization is implemented. Consequently, it is difficult to make accurate 
predictions about the effect of openness on the economy.
The positive and significant effect of the landlocked variable on income 
inequality (INEQ 10%) means that being landlocked has the greatest negative effect on 
the most poor in the population, and this effect is independent of the regional location. 
The challenge posed to landlocked countries has in recent times been given attention by 
the United Nations, which for sometime now has promoted strategies to help reduce 
poverty and income inequality in landlocked countries, especially in its Decade for the 
Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006) program.
In furtherance of the goal to reduce poverty and income inequality in landlocked 
countries, the United Nations in 2003 convened in Almaty (Kazakhstan) an international 
ministerial conference to enhance transit transport cooperation between landlocked and 
transit developing countries. In 2004, at the 58th General Assembly Session, the United 
Nations adopted the Almaty Program of Action that deals with infrastructural 
development and maintenance, transit policy issues, trade facilitation measures, and 
technical assistance to developing countries and especially landlocked countries. The 
adoption of the resolution was in recognition of the fact that apart from poor 
infrastructure, weak institutional and productive capacities, small domestic markets and 
more importantly remoteness from world markets plague most of the landlocked 
countries. These factors make the landlocked countries highly susceptible or vulnerable 
to external shocks (United Nations, 2004; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD], 2006).
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The governance variable is negative and significantly correlated with income 
inequality in the regressions with and without regional controls. This finding supports the 
view that good governance, which is an indication of responsive, noncorrupted, and 
efficient government, has a positive impact on income distribution. Thus, good 
governance or institutions affect both the size of the national social pie and how it is 
distributed. As noted by Acemoglu et al. (2003), institutions not only affect the economic 
prospects of nations but are also central to the distribution of income among various 
individuals and groups in society. Likewise, Lopez (2003) claims that good governance 
would ensure that rent seeking by privileged groups is avoided or at the least reduced and 
also ensures that government bureaucracies concentrate on enhancing the opportunities 
and possibilities of the poor.
The privatization and income inequality regression cross product results show that 
only the privatization and openness interaction variable is significant and positively 
correlated with income inequality. This means that privatization is expected to worsen 
income disparities in more open economies. The reason for this finding might be due to 
the fact that most developing countries opened their economies to investors to purchase 
SOE without a special reference to the distributional implications of the privatization 
process. In recognition of this problem, Kikeri and Sunita (1992) assert that governments 
must pay special attention to developing social safety nets in terms of severance 
packages, unemployment benefits and redeployment programs to help offset any negative 
effects of privatization on workers. Similarly, Kessides (2004) claims that the full gains 
of privatization in terms of its economic and social benefits are dependent on both 
competition and regulation. The implications of the study’s findings are discussed next.
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Implications
The main finding of this study is that privatization policy did not have a significant 
impact on economic growth and income inequality in the developing world between 1991 
and 2002. Also, the study finds that geography, institutional infrastructure, and FDI are 
important factors that explain the disparities in economic growth and income disparities 
in developing countries. These findings have important policy implications. First, the 
results of this study and others (Cook and Uchida, 2003; Filipovic, 2005; Yoder et al., 
1991) indicate that privatization policy needs to be reconsidered as to its real benefits in 
the developing world.
Second, policy makers should focus on economy-wide reforms that promote 
institutional development and macroeconomic stability to stimulate economic 
development. As noted by Cook and Uchida (2003), the lack of appropriate governmental 
reforms might be the cause for an insignificant impact of privatization on economic 
growth. Further, Romer and Romer (1998), claim that policies that lead to lower rates of 
inflation may lead to high growth rates and subsequent well-being of the poor. 
Accordingly, if as Zinnes et al. (2001) suggest; change of ownership alone is not 
sufficient to ensure economic efficiency, then the lesson for developing countries is to 
develop the necessary competition and regulatory framework to enhance the success of 
privatization.
Obviously, without the necessary regulatory framework, privatization will only 
result in public monopolies being replaced with private ones. This point is supported by 
most of the studies reviewed above, which indicate that privatization’s impact is heavily 
influenced by country conditions, in particular the quality of regulation (Eduardo and
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Ugo, 2002). Eduardo and Ugo (2002) observe that distributional equity gains from 
privatization are driven by the effectiveness of regulation. Similarly, Chisari et al. (1999) 
argue that how serious a government is about fair distribution of privatization benefits is 
reflected in how serious it is about regulation.
Third, of all the explanatory variables examined, only governance infrastructure 
has a significant positive impact on both economic growth and income distribution, 
which shows the importance of country-specific characteristics and even more important, 
government leadership in establishing the necessary institutional infrastructure to secure 
economic development. It is important to note that when the individual governance 
indicators were used, it is only the government effectiveness and rule of law variables 
that had a significant effect on both economic growth and income distribution. The rule 
of law variable was significant at the 5%level in both cases, while the government 
effectiveness variable was significant at the 1% level in the growth regressions and 5% 
level in the inequality regressions.
Evidently, the challenge for the developing world is not just ensuring economic 
efficiency, but also how to correct the impression that even where there have been 
positive gains; entrepreneurs, business elites, and the well connected in society have 
benefited at the expense of the poor. Improving the governance infrastructure therefore 
might be the first and most important step in meeting this challenge. This is because good 
governance will reduce rent-seeking opportunities associated with non-transparent 
divestiture process. It is indeed an interesting coincidence as Abdul (2000) has noted that 
the World Bank’s Privatization: the lessons o f experience and Governance and 
Development were both issued in 1992. The Bank’s argument in the governance report is
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that failures of its programs were frequently connected to the quality of government or 
‘government failure’ (Yarrow, 1999).
This link between privatization and good governance results from a reversal of an 
approach which involved complete mistrust of the state to one which accepts that state 
bears the responsibility for the creation of an appropriate institutional framework (Abdul, 
2000). In 1995, the World Bank released another report, titled Bureaucrats in Business, 
the underlying argument of this report was that privatization and state sector reforms 
were dependent on country conditions especially the presence of suitable regulation. The 
biggest lesson from this study is that in promoting the market economy, the issue is not 
just reducing the role of the state or by-pass government, but even more important how to 
make government more accountable (Zagha et al., 2006). As noted by the World Bank 
Report (2005), privatization is not just about finding “better owners” than government 
but changing governance to separate the commercial from the political, as government 
can use a wide range of policies to influence a firm’s decision.
Finally, in the midst of the inconsistency of the results of the privatization studies 
and the general agreement that the institutional environment matters, it will be important 
to take note of the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz’ suggestion for a slow and more 
deliberate privatization as opposed to the current crisis driven and international donor 
organization’s emphasis on privatization as a conditionality for giving loans to 
developing countries. In support of this viewpoint, the World Bank (2005) reports that 
pragmatic and incremental approaches to process of privatization might be more 
effective. The report further notes that there is no universally appropriate reform model, 
and that privatization is not necessary or indispensable for every country. This means that
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privatization programs need to be explicit in terms of the country-specific conditions; 
institutional, social, and political characteristics. The World Bank’s (2005) observation 
however is not new. In 1992, the World Bank, in its Policy Research Bulletin made a 
similar statement as follows:
Privatization is not a blanket solution for the problems of poorly 
performing SOEs. It cannot in and of itself make totally for the 
lack of competition, for weak capital markets, or for the absence of 
an appropriate regulatory framework. But where the market is 
basically competitive, or when a modicum of regulatory capacity is 
present, private ownership yields substantial benefits.
Likewise, Zagha et al. (2006) claim that whereas the mere emphasis on trade or 
private sector reforms can lead to efficiency gains, they will not put the economy on a 
sustained growth path unless they also strengthen production incentives and address 
market or government failures that undercut the efforts to accumulate capital and boost 
productivity. Reforms should therefore not focus on just the efficient use of resources, 
but also on the expansion of capacity and growth. Zagha et al. (2006) further indicate that 
countries that are successful at reforms are those that take into consideration the local 
domestic capacity and conditions in consideration and as such are designed in concert 
with structural policies that enable the domestic economy to restructure and spread the 
cost of adjustment in a manner that minimizes output losses.
In fact, this is the idea suggested by the World Bank Report (2005) that better 
policies can bring efficiency gains and may increase incentives for investment, but 
without accounting to a growth strategy. This observation by the World Bank' (2005) is 
based on the premise that efficiency gains will not necessarily induce the behavior of
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private investors and public sector that is needed to put an economy on a sustained 
growth path. Obviously, the incentives needed to expand productive capacity differ from 
those that are needed to use the capacity better. Certainly, what matters for growth is less 
the degree to which policies approximate the ideal than the extent to which a 
development strategy is able to mobilize the creative forces of society and achieve higher 
levels of productivity (Zagha, 2006). Accordingly, the challenge for developing countries 
is how to improve and add on to their physical and human capital by both the private and 
public sectors to enhance productivity.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
A few limitations of the study are worth noting. First, the lack of consistent data limited 
the analysis to a maximum of 75 countries in the growth regressions and 60 countries in 
the income inequality regressions out of the 80 countries studied. Second, the study 
examined the impact of total privatization and did not address the impact of different 
methods of privatization on economic development. A few studies have reported 
differential effects of the various methods of privatization on economic growth (Bennett 
et al., 2004; Earle, 2002). Third, the type of industries privatized may also have an effect 
on economic performance. Many studies on privatization of infrastructure, finance, and 
manufacturing firms indicate differences in the industry effect of privatization. The lack 
of consistent data on the revenues generated from the various methods of privatization 
and industries did not allow us to control for these factors. The World Bank’s 
privatization database reports the types of industries privatized, but not the amount 
generated from each sector, consequently, we are unable to control for any bias that
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might be due to differences in the type of industry privatized. Finally, the effect of 
privatization is dependent on what the privatization proceeds are used for; it may be used 
to retire debt, saved, transferred to budget or used in capital expenditures. The validity of 
the findings of the study is therefore limited to the extent that the aforementioned factors 
impact the growth process.
The implications and limitations of this study point to new directions for research. 
First, there is the need for studies on the impact of different methods of privatization and 
the sectors privatized on economic development. Second, longitudinal studies would need 
to be conducted to identify the dynamic effects of privatization in the different regions of 
the world as data becomes available. Third, the inconsistency in results suggests the need 
for more bottom-up studies to complement the global studies. Forth, the policy 
environment, in particular the roles played by competition and its regulation needs to be 
examined if the relation between privatization and economic development is to be better 
understood. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the triad (growth, income distribution, 
and poverty) is needed to give direction to policy makers as to the best strategy to 
promote growth, reduce poverty levels and subsequently reduce income disparities.
Conclusion
The study examined the impact of privatization on economic growth and income 
inequality in various regions of the developing world between 1991 and 2002. The study 
finds that privatization did not play a significant role in promoting economic growth and 
reducing income inequalities in developing countries. Though, the study is one of the first 
to control for regional groupings in analyzing the impact of privatization in the
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developing world, the results reported do not support the hypothesis that privatization 
boosted economic growth in developing countries between 1991 and 2002.
The results of the study, however, indicate that country conditions including good 
governance infrastructure is more likely to promote growth and contribute to a reduction 
in income inequality, which suggests that country-specific characteristics may be more 
important in promoting growth and reducing income inequality than any economic policy 
per se. Obviously, the quality of government determines the quality and the success of 
economic decision making. As far back as 1992, the World Bank’s report ‘Privatization: 
The lessons o f  experience,’ indicated that the failures of most its programs were 
frequently connected to the quality of government. Similarly, Ramamurti (1999) asserts 
that the problem in many of the developing countries has not been the political reluctance 
or commitment, but the absence of an adequate infrastructure to support privatization in 
situations where local buyers have lacked finance and expertise and government have had 
to extend protection and subsidies. These issues suggest that the privatization process 
needs to be gradual to give developing countries the opportunity to learn and develop the 
requisite institutional infrastructure to ensure the success of policy reforms being 
implemented by most countries in the region.
The inconsistencies in the results of the various studies and findings of this study 
require a careful analysis of privatization as it has unfolded in the various regions of the 
world. The future in research with data permitting is to examine how the various sectors 
privatized, the methods of privatization, and the type of ownership (local or foreign) 
impact the economy as a whole. In the end, however, the debate should not just focus on 
the superiority of the private firm over SOEs or vice versa, but more important, how to
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create the necessary market supporting institutional environment needed to promote 
economic growth and reduce income inequality. This should shift the debate from a focus 
on mere government failure or mistrust of the state to one which acknowledges that the 
state bears the responsibility for the creation and maintenance of appropriate institutional 
framework. Clearly, the biggest challenge for developing countries is not merely how to 
reduce the role of the state but even more important to make it more accountable. 
Accordingly, this study argues that privatization and deregulation can have potentially 
significant positive impact on both economic growth and distributional equity, but this 
potential effect is dependent on the establishment of effective institutions. We conclude 
by stating that both the country conditions and market conditions matter in the success of 
economic reforms of which privatization is a major component.
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Appendix
Table 1A : Privatization Revenues and Economic Growth Rate Data 1991—2002
Countries PR/GDP AGDP Countries PR/GDP
Angola 0.08 6.88 Ecuador 0.82 1.32
Benin 1.38 5.18 El Salvador 11.49 3.08
Burkina Faso 0.45 5.18 Grenada 1.62 4.48
Burundi 0.45 1.65 Guatemala 6.90 3.45
Cameroon 4.04 4.73 Guyana 2.42 1.57
Chad 0.06 5.82 Haiti 0.46 1.13
Congo Rep. 0.12 2.52 Honduras 1.29 2.67
Cote d’Ivoire 5.34 2.15 Jamaica 4.83 0.77
Eritrea 0.31 3.02 Mexico 11.56 3.87
Ethiopia 4.24 4.57 Nicaragua 0.01 4.48
Gabon 0.06 0.30 Panama 7.77 2.6
Ghana 14.74 4.28 Paraguay 0.28 0.95
Guinea 1.34 4.05 Peru 15.43 2.33
Kenya 2.74 1.25 Uruguay 0.08 -1.43
Lesotho 6.88 2.62 Venezuela 7.02 0.05
Madagascar 1.25 2.30 Algeria 0.03 2.8
Malawi 1.44 2.18 Bahrain 0.14 4.4
Mali 1.76 5.47 Egypt 5.51 4.57
Mauritania 5.19 4.28 Iran 0.02 4.45
Mauritius 6.74 5.4 Jordan 9.39 3.78
Mozambique 6.74 9.28 Lebanon 0.77 1.83
Niger 1.49 3.58 Morocco 16.58 2.88
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Table 1A : Privatization Revenues and Economic Growth Rate Data 1991- 2002
Countries PR/GDP AGDP Countries PR/GDP
Nigeria 3.23 1.75 Oman 3.09 4.07
Sao Tome and Qatar
Principe 0.00 3.00 0.00 9.78
Senegal 8.47 5.33 Saudi Arabia 0.00 1.90
Sierra Leone 0.25 -1.78 Tunisia 2.70 4.97
South Africa United Arab
2.42 2.27 Emirates 0.32 4.22
Sudan 0.09 7.32 Yemen Rep. 0.01 4.87
Tanzania 4.96 4.53 Bangladesh 0.18 5.00
Togo 0.99 1.48 India 2.9 5.33
Uganda 4.71 5.62 Nepal 0.01 4.08
Zambia 24.26 2.65 Pakistan 4.43 3.58
Zimbabwe 3.99 -3.22 Sri Lanka 5.88 3.95
Argentina 14.53 -2.12 China 4.00 7.75
Bolivia 0.05 2.62 Fiji 0.11 2.28
Brazil 20.59 1.95 Lao PDR 0.04 5.78
Chile Papua New
0.23 3.03 Guinea 5.42 -0.52
Colombia 4.46 0.85 Philippines 6.09 3.27
Costa Rica 0.02 4.82 Thailand 2.94 0.4
Dominican Rep 4.71 6.18 Vietnam 0.04 5.28
Sources: World Bank Privatization Database; Human Development Report, 2005; World 
Economic Outlook (2004) and Global Development Network Growth Database
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Table 2A: Privatization Revenues, and Income Inequality Data 1991- 2002
Countries INEQ 10% INEQ 20% Countries INEQ 10%
Burkina Faso 26.20 13.60 Ecuador 44.90 17.30
Burundi 19.30 9.50 El Salvador 47.40 19.80
Congo Rep. 15.70 9.10 Guatemala 55.10 24.40
Cote d’Ivoire 16.60 9.70 Honduras 49.10 21.50
Ethiopia 6.60 4.30 Jamaica 11.40 6.90
Ghana 14.10 8.40 Mexico 45.00 19.30
Guinea 12.30 7.30 Nicaragua 15.50 8.80
Kenya 13.60 8.20 Panama 62.30 24.70
Lesotho 105.00 44.20 Paraguay 73.40 27.80
Madagascar 19.20 11.00 Peru 49.90 18.40
Malawi 22.70 11.60 Uruguay 18.90 10.40
Mali 23.10 12.20 Venezuela 62.90 17.90
Mauritania 12.00 7.40 Bahrain 9.60 6.10



















































































































Table 3A: Variables, Symbols, and Sources of Data Collection
Variable Symbol Source of Data
Privatization Revenues PR World Bank Privatization Database and
as
a percentage of GDP
World Economic Outlook (2004)
INFLATION INF World Economic Outlook (2004)
FDI share in GDP FDI/GDP Global Development Network Growth 
Database And UNCTAD FDI database 
online
Real GDP growth rate GROWTH World Economic Outlook (2004) and Global 
Development Network Growth Database
Real GDP per capita RGCAP World Economic Outlook (2004) and Global 
Development Network Growth Database
Governance GOV Kaufmann et al. (2005)
Trade share as a OPEN Global Development Network Growth
percentage of GDP Database
Secondary School SEC. Global Development Network Growth
enrolment Database
Share of income of 
richest and poorest 2 0 % 
of population.
INEQ20% Human Development Report, 2005
Share of income of 
richest and poorest 1 0 % 
of population.
INEQ 10% Human Development Report, 2005
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Table 4A: List of Landlocked Countries.
Landlocked country Region
Bolivia Latin America




Laos Republic Sub-Saharan Africa
Lesotho Sub -Saharan Africa
Malawi Sub -Saharan Africa
Mali Sub -Saharan Africa
Nepal Asia
Niger Sub -Saharan Africa
Paraguay Latin America
Uganda Sub -Saharan Africa
Zambia Sub -Saharan Africa
Zimbabwe Sub -Saharan Africa
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Table 5A: Variables Used in Study
INF9102 Inflation 1991-2002
ARGDP9102 Average Real GDP Growth 1991- 2002
PR19102 Privatization Revenues as a percentage of GDP 1991-2002
INEQ 10% Ratio of the richest and poorest 10% of population
INEQ20% Ratio of the richest and poorest 10% of population
POP9102 Average population growth rate 1991- 2002
FDI9102 Average FDI 1991 - 2002
INIGCAP91 Initial Real GDP per capita 1991
LIRGNICAP91 Log of the Initial Real GDP per capita
LGCAPSQ Square of LIRGNICAP91
PRIFDI Privatization and FDI interaction
PRIOPEN Privatization ad Openness interaction
PRIGOV Privatization ad Governance interaction
SSA Dummy Sub -Saharan Africa
LA Dummy for Latin America
AS Dummy for Asia
MENA Middle East and North African countries
PRSSA Privatization Sub-Saharan Africa interaction
PRLA Privatization Latin American interaction
PRAS Privatization Asian interaction
FAC1_2 Governance 1996 -  2002




Rule Rule of Law
CORR Corruption
LLOCK Dummy for Landlocked











Table 6A: Raw Data for Analysis
Countries INF9102 ARGDP PRI8890 PRI91
Angola 891.15 6.88 0.00 0.08
Benin 7.23 5.18 1.57 1.38
Burkina
Faso 4.41 5.18 0.00 0.45
Burundi 13.65 1.65 0.00 0.45
Cameroon 5.05 4.73 0.00 4.04
Chad 5.87 5.82 0.00 0.06
Congo Rep. 7.04 2.52 0.00 0.12
Cote
d’Ivoire 5.84 2.15 0.00 5.34
Eritrea 11.32 3.02 0.00 0.31
Ethiopia 5.27 4.57 0.00 4.24
Gabon 4.34 0.30 0.00 0.06
Ghana 25.99 4.28 0.18 14.74
Guinea 6.92 4.05 0.00 1.34
Kenya 14.13 1.25 0.24 2.74
Lesotho 10.34 2.62 0.00 6.88
Madagascar 16.12 2.30 0.00 1.25
Malawi 30.43 2.18 0.00 1.44
Mali 4.20 5.47 1.76
Mauritania 5.73 4.28 0.00 5.19
Mauritius 6.93 5.40 0.00 6.74
Mozambique 27.6 9.28 0.17 6.74
Niger 5.23 3.58 0.00 1.49
Nigeria 28.13 1.75 0.18 3.23
Sao Tome
and Principe 32.54 3.00 0.00 0.00
Senegal 4.19 5.33 0.00 8.47
Sierra Leone 28.87 -1.78 0.00 0.25
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PRIFDI PRIOPEN PRIGOV SSA LAMERICA MENA
11.91 0.95 -0.17 0 0 0
60.40 2.80 0.53 0 0 0
15.83 0.17 -0.05 0 0 0
1 2 . 0 1 0.08 -0.76 0 0 0
211.25 1.37 -4.03 0 0 0
3.35 0.51 -0.05 0 0 0
16.06 0.72 -0.19 0 0 0
397.08 8.76 -2.4 0 0 0
31.48 1.42 -0 . 0 1 0 0 0
182.7 5.05 -1.9 0 0 0
5.45 -0 . 1 0 -0 . 0 2 0 0 0
1355.49 28.30 3.6 0 0 0
65.61 0.76 -0.98 0 0 0
166.78 0.79 -2.47 0 0 0
923.23 102.79 3.11 0 0 0
6 6 . 8 6 0.96 -0 . 0 2 0 0 0
92.82 0.78 0 . 1 0 0 0 0
113.31 3.66 -0 . 6 8 0 0 0
499.49 12.82 0 . 0 2 0 0 0
858.47 6.94 1 1 . 8 6 0 0 0
334.24 26.89 -1.45 0 0 0
61.21 0.70 -1.06 0 0 0
257.56 12.37 -4.96 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
576.38 11.18 0.04 0 0 0
10.87 0.16 -0.38 0 0 0
128.43 2.78 2.51 0 0 0
2.3 0.15 -0.19 0 0 0
207.43 11.41 -4.26 0 0 0
76.63 1.79 -0.38 0 0 0















Countries INF9102 ARGDP PRI8890
Zambia 60.97 1040.23 3.02
Zimbabwe 69.38 2976.28 3.47
Argentina 24.86 7932.06 3.90
Bolivia 48.02 2480.5 3.39
Brazil 21.83 6221.51 3.79
Chile 59.81 6516.21 3.81
Colombia 38.29 4984.73 3.70
Costa Rica 90.35 4873.8 3.69
Dominican Rep 90.92 3136.74 3.5
Ecuador 55.68 3842.59 3.58
El Salvador 62.78 3561.23 3.55
Grenada 118.8 4825.42 3.68
Guatemala 44.82 3612.11 3.56
Guyana 204.54 2484.78 3.40
Haiti 41.53 963.79 2.98
Honduras 96.56 2155.78 3.33
Jamaica 93.68 3941.86 3.60
Mexico 60.86 7371.93 3.87
Nicaragua 70.79 2045.83 3.31
Panama 145.33 5387.52 3.73
Paraguay 65.76 4948.81 3.69
Peru 32.76 3766.29 3.58
Uruguay 45.32 7544.87 3.88
Venezuela 39.86 7315.47 3.86
Algeria 55.64 4933.71 3.69
Bahrain 145.45 12030.85 4.08
Egypt 41.61 3372.05 3.53
Iran 41.72 4024.36 3.60
Jordan 114.1 3303.64 3.52
Lebanon 55.86 4263.24 3.63
Morocco 64.12 3726.51 3.57
Oman 88.87 16368.92 4.21
















































































































Saudi Arabia 63.52 12862.99 4.11
Tunisia 91.03 5025.46 3.70
United Arab
Emirates 78.05
Yemen Rep. 136.5 927.75 2.97
Bangladesh 32.38 1293.23 3.11
India 25.98 1665.63 3.22
Nepal 69.43 1139.11 3.06
Pakistan 55.47 1798.27 3.25
Sri Lanka 35.83 2593.53 3.41
China 80.69 1977.23 3.30
Fiji 44.91 5013.84 3.70
Lao PDR 67.87 1107.22 3.04
Papua New
Guinea 93.63 2983.59 3.47
Philippines 102.76 2949.8 3.47
Thailand 108.25 5166.63 3.71
Vietnam 103.64 1129.78 3.05




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Principe 0 0
Senegal 0 0
Sierra Leone 0 0
South Africa 0 0
Sudan 0 0
Tanzania 0 0









































































































































































Sri Lanka 0 0
China 0 0
Fiji 0 0
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